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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
John Adams was the only leading official in George Washington's 
two administrations who was not influential in formulating the govern­
ment's policies toward Great Britain during the Anglo-American imbroglio 
which plagued the United States until after the ratification of Jay's 
Treaty in 1795. This was the case, despite the fact that Adams was a 
seasoned diplomat, a former minister to the Court of St. James and the 
vice-president of the United States.
Adams was isolated from the diplomatic maehineiy of the new cen­
tral government because he refused to identify the well-being of the 
American Republic solely with the political fortunes of the burgeoning 
Federalist party. Nonetheless, Adams believed that it was imperative 
for the United States to seek satisfactory relations with Great Britain 
in order to permit a greater flow of commerce and to free the American- 
Canadian frontier from border conflict.
Lacking the influence to sway his colleagues in the Washington 
administration, Adams used his position in the Senate, whenever possi­
ble, to prevent the enactment of legislation that might have ruptured 
the peace between the two English-speaking nations during the last 
decade of the eighteenth century. The role which Adams played in the 
Senate, as its presiding officer, and the comments he made concerning 
the events taking place around him revealed not only the Vice-Presi­
dent's dedication to peace and neutrality, but his vital concern for 
the future of the Republic.
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During the course of events Adams plotted the growth of politi­
cal parties in the United States while condemning their presence. He 
measured his chances for succeeding Washington in the presidency in 
light of Jay’s Treaty and he strove to remain neutral while partisan­
ship flamed around him. And after the treaty was ratified, Adams con­
cluded that the results of Jay’s negotiations were a great step toward 
better relations with Great Britain and beneficial to the United 
States as well.
CHAPTEE I: A MISSION TO LONDON
CHâPTER I 
A MISSION TO LONDON
In the early years of the American Republic, foreign relations 
consumed the energies of both the Confederation and Federal govern­
ments. The United States was often prey to the imperial designs of 
three powerful European states— England, France and Spain— whose 
possessions in North America still remained the stage for inter- 
hemispheric conflicts in the late eighteenth century as th^ had in 
the seventeenth. England, the Americans’ wartime enemy, sought to 
minimize her loss of the colonies by harassing them with economic 
warfare. France, the nation’s troublesome ally, kept the United 
States moored to an alliance designed to sustain French power in 
North America. And Spain, perceptively suspicious of the hemispheric 
ambitions of the British, French and Americans, stràve to undermine 
the Republic’s authority in the lower Mississippi Valley.
The machinations of these three powers kept the Revolutionary 
generation of American diplomats engaged in international politics 
for fifty years after the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, the 
paramount significance of foreign affairs may be illustrated by the 
fact that, with the singular exception of George Washington, all 
presidents before 1829 were seasoned diplomats. The results of Amer­
ican diplomacy during this era were bountiful, but they were not 
achieved easily. Americans endured many crises during the first
a
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years of the Republic before the vital interests of the nation were 
secured.
The first diplomatic crisis to arise in the post-war period 
centered on Anglo-American relations. At the outset of the Republic 
Americans hoped to secure reciprocal navigation and trade agreements 
with Great Britain, thereby reviving the profitable trade patterns of 
the colonial era. The nation was anxious also to open its wilderness 
frontiers to peaceful settlement. But the British refused to accept 
American commercial proposals and they were unwilling to relinquish 
control over the vast wilderness of American territory adjacent to 
Canada that yielded fur-bearing profits. Conversely, in the United 
States there were some who refused to restore the confiscated prop­
erty of expatriated Tories. And many Americans refused to pay bona 
fide debts to English creditors. These differences, which grew out 
of the Peace of Paris, compounded with others that came as a result 
of the war, prepared the basis for a long and disquieting imbroglio 
that threatened the peace between the two English-speaking nations 
until the consummation of Jay’s Treaty in 1796. The task of resolving 
the differences which arose between the two nations was first assigned 
to John Adams, who was appointed minister to the Court of St. James 
in 178b.
Born in 1735 in Massachusetts, the descendant of yeoman Puri­
tans, John Adams rose to fame during the American Revolution. Adams’ 
father encouraged him to stucfy for the ministry, but in a fit of 
independence that was to characterize him for life Adams chose a 
career in law. On the eve of the Revolution John Adams was a well-
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seasoned attorney, enjoying a spate of success, contentedly married 
to his profession.
When Parliamentary intransigence forced the colonists to take 
up arms, the middle-aged lawyer joined the rebels and supported inde­
pendence. In 177li Adams became a member of the Continental Congress 
and in the following year published the Novanglus letters which vigor­
ously upheld the rights of the Bay Colony against the oppression of 
the English government. Adams was impatient with the moderates in 
Congress who hoped for a reconciliation with the mother country, and 
as a result of his lucid and forceful attacks upon their position he 
won the respect and admiration of his colleagues. His later appoint­
ment to the committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence 
was a tribute to both Adams’ ability and loyalty to the revolutionary 
cause. His competence was further recognized in 1777 when Adams was 
designated a "militia diplomat," the only civil honor the beleaguered 
Congress could bestow.
Adams’ abilities were soon exposed to the international arena. 
In February of 1777, he was sent abroad to replace Silas Deane as one 
of the American diplomatic triumvirate in Paris. Thereafter, a decade 
of diplomatic service overseas was to be interrupted only by a brief 
visit to Massachusetts in 1779 to serve in its constitutional conven­
tion.
While waiting at the conference table in Paris for the British 
to treat with the Americans, Adams journeyed to The Hague and served 
as interim minister to the United Dutch Provinces. There he concluded 
a treaty of amity and commerce. But more important, Adams secured the
7
first Dutch loan, making The Hague mission probably his most success­
ful. Then after lengthy peace negotiations with the British which 
ended in 1783, Adams prepared to return to his law practice and to 
his native state. Instead, he was appointed American minister to his 
former sovereign, George III.^
Adams' mission to England was not contrived as an attempt to 
ameliorate the conditions which arose from the Revolution itself. The 
new minister was instructed to negotiate a commercial accord with the 
British Sapire, to secure full execution of the Treaty of I783 by the 
English, and to resolve differences which were not settled at Paris.
While Adams was in London the major concerns of the United 
States were commerce and the British garrisons on the American fron­
tier. The need to restore the flow of Anglo-American trade, paralyzed 
for nearly ten years by war, was necessary for the nation to thrive.
It was imperative also that the Americans enjoy a strife-free frontier 
adjacent to Canada in order for the country to subsist.
Adams faced a formidable task in attempting to restore Anglo- 
American trade favorable to the United States, though at one time 
during the peace negotiations of 1782-1783 it appeared that Great 
Britain would adopt a conciliatory commercial policy towards the new 
nation as a counter-balance to the Franco-American alliance. the 
time Adams arrived in London in 178ii, however, the cry of the English
^Worthington C. Ford, "Adams, John," Dictionary of American 
Biography, I, 72 -* 82 | Phge Smith, John Adams, 2 vols. (Hew York, 
1963), hereafter cited as Smith, John Adams ; Gilbert Ghinard, Honest 
John Adams (Boston, 1933), hereafter cited as Ghinard, Honest John 
Adams.
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mercantile community for protection from competitive goods was written 
into law. The United States was not in the Empire, and the English 
Navigation Acts, the cornerstone of mercantilism, barred much American 
produce and manufacturers and all American ships from imperial ports. 
To be sure, some American goods, principally raw materials and food­
stuffs, were finding markets in British ports, but they were being 
transported in English ships, manned by English crews, and burdened 
with hea?y import duties. The envoys' task was to open the ports to 
American trade carried in ships owned and operated by Americans and 
to seek most favored nation customs duties. Renewing normal commer­
cial relations between the two countries hinged upon several factors 
which Adams focused upon in a draft treaty which the American minister 
presented to Lord Carmarthen, the British Foreign Secretary, on July 
29, 1785. Adams’ proposals called for "the most perfect equality and 
reciprocity," He recommended that citizens in either country were to 
be permitted to reside and pay duties in the other if they were na­
tionals. They were to be free to send any kind of goods, wherever 
produced or manufactured, in ships of any size and any class of crew, 
to all points in one another's territories subject only to the right 
of either nation to prohibit (for reasons of State) specified imports
and exports. And each country was to guarantee the other customs
2levies based upon most favored nation treatment.
Sir A. W. Ward and 3. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of British 
Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 193^), I, l^L-l^ 
hereafter cited as Ward and Gooch, History of Britisn Foreign Policy; 
"Views of John Adams Relative to American Relations with Great Britain," 
in Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, 3rd ed, (New York, 
1959) pp. 50-51, hereafter cited as Bartlett, American Diplomacy.
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Adams’ draft also called for a variety of other provisions.
In time of war between either country and a third nation, the Ameri­
can envoy suggested that the principles of "free ships, free goods" 
and "eneny ships and enemy goods" be recognized; that contraband of 
war, if found on the vessels of one of the contracting parties, not 
be confiscated but deposited in a port of the captor and paid for; 
that no embargo be placed on the shipping of the nation not engaged 
in the war, and that the citizens of neither country be permitted to 
take letters of marque from a third nation and prey upon the commerce
3of the other contracting power.
The minister’s treaty draft fell upon deaf ears in Downing 
Street and at Whitehall. The British merchants, Carmarthen, and the 
King were unwilling to grant any tangible concessions to the Ameri­
cans. Moreover, Adams’ position was somewhat undermined by the fact 
that many administrative relaxations of the Navigation Acts provided 
a sizeable degree of Anglo-American trade from which some Americans 
were benefiting. Besides, various informal devices were employed by 
both the British and the Americans to circumvent the restrictions of 
the English government’s commercial policy. In the West Indies, for 
instance, traders of both countries often used the joint ownership 
of ships to accomodate the American desire for the carrying trade 
and to satisfy the West Indian need for cheap food stuffs and naval 
stores. On the northern frontier, a host of rural regulations un­
fettered trade between the United States and the Canadian provinces
%ard and Gooch, History of British Foreign Policy, I, l51,
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with unofficial sanction. Nothing in Adams' correspondence indicates 
whether or not he was cognizant of the extent of informal trade be­
tween Americans and Englishmen in the New World.^
The envoy's' principal concern was the need for more equitable 
commercial arrangements between the United States and Great Britain. 
Adams insisted that Americans permitted the British to carry goods in 
English ships into the Republic's ports without punitive restriction. 
Adams’ position, as a diplomat, did not reflect precisely the exist­
ing commercial practices of the Americans. Each of the States in the 
Confederation resorted to economic reprisals against English ships 
and goods in the hope of breaking down trade barriers. Such attempts 
usually proved futile since the demand for British manufactured goods 
persisted. Moreover, Britain's need for raw materials was exceeded 
only by the American willingness to furnish them, despite the inequit­
ies of the Navigation Acts. Furthermore, the States were engaged in 
commercial warfare among themselves, which was a factor advantageous 
to England.
In spite of the difficulties presented by the presence of the 
Canadian and West Indian trade, and the inability of the States to 
hinder the existing pattern of commerce, Adams persisted in his ef­
forts to seek a solution to what he perceived as the existence of
^A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British 
North America,. (New Haven, 19Üd), pp., -59, hereafter cited 'as 
Burt, United, States and British North America; S. E, Morison, The 
Maritime Wstoiy of Mas sac Hu s e t t s ' Y7' 8 3"-TH6'ü ' "(C amb ridge, 1961) , 
pp. 31-32.
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"commercial hostilities." These hostilities, he believed, were 
contrived by the British to drive American ships from the seas and 
to encourage continued American dependence upon the English merchant 
and manufacturer. Infuriated by the fact that the British could 
enjoy the benefits of the American trade without extending any bind­
ing commercial concessions in exchange, the envoy called upon the 
Confederation Congress for positive action to prevent a continuation 
of the status quo.̂
Adams reported that Britain was jealous of American commercial 
power and frightened by the prospect of an American navy. He con­
cluded that the only way the United States could expect favorable 
treatment from the British would be to enact navigation laws prohi­
biting American trade with England and to build a fleet of ships to 
enforce them. Congress was powerless to enact trade legislation and 
the States would not furnish funds for a navy. Furthermore, the 
consistent commercial strife among themselves and the British pre­
cluded any joint action being taken. By September, 1785, only three 
months after his arrival in London, Adams abandoned the commercial 
treaty proposition, disgusted both with his countrymen and the English. 
Having reached such an early impasse on the trade subject, the Ameri­
can envoy proceeded to concentrate on the western posts garrisoned by 
British regulars.
^John Adams to John Jay, London, August 6, 1785, in Ruhl J. 
Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, 3rd ed. (.New Tork, 19.59), 
pp. 50-5l, hereafter cited as,Bartlett, American Diplomacy.
6lbid.
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The existence of English troops on American soil after the 
Peace of I783 was probably more painful to the fledgling republic 
than the inequities of Anglo-American commerce, for the presence of 
the soldiers revealed, in fine, the strength of imperial Britain and 
the weakness of republican America. This facet of the post-war situ­
ation was initiated by the British before the Treaty of Paris 
became effective. The British government ordered the Canadian 
Governor-General, Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, to hold certain 
posts on the American-Canadian frontier on the day before George III 
proclaimed English ratification of the peace treaty. By doing this,
the British government was in a position to insure that the United
7States fulfilled their obligations under the treaty.
Specifically, the English planned to hold the posts until 
American debtors paid their English creditors for debts contracted 
before the Revolution. By the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of 
the Treaty, no impediments were to be placed in the way of debt re­
covery by British subjects. The States were to be recommended to 
repeal their Confiscation Acts directed at land-holding Loyalists 
who crossed the British lines during the war. Furthermore, the 
Treaty forbade any further confiscations.
The problem was complicated by the fact that the English mer­
chants insisted that interest be paid on the debts from the time th^
^Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's Treatys A Study Commerce and Diplo­
macy (New York, 1923), pp. 109-133, hereafter cited as Bemis, Jay's 
Treaty; A. C. McLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the British Debts," 
American Historical Association Report for lQ9h, pp. Ll6-i|,17.
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were contracted. Unfortunately, in many instances the States dis­
regarded the recommendations of the Treaty altogether. Th^ contin­
ued to sequester debts, harass loyalists attempting to recover their 
property, and used the rule of escheat liberally to alienate real 
property from its rightful, but un-American owners.
Adams was mindful of the furor created in England over the 
American disregard for debts, and he did not favor his countrymen’s 
confiscatory actions. Yet, Adams persisted in claiming before his 
adversary in Downing Street that the abandonment of the forts by the 
British would encourage the Americans to pay their just debts. Fur­
thermore, the envoy insisted that the demand for interest on the debts 
was unreasonable since the social upheaval resulting from the Revolu­
tion cancelled all contracts. Adams also stressed the need for ex­
tension of the time for payment.®
Beyond the official position of the British government on the 
western posts question, however, was an imperial policy to insure 
that the American-Canadian frontier was dominated by the English in 
order to protect vital economic interests of the Hudson Bay Company, 
a fur-trading dominion in the eastern Canadian regions adjacent to 
American soil. Here was a vast wilderness, inhabited principally by 
Indians, which yielded the Company a highly profitable supply of 
animal furs for export to European nations. The British, anxious 
to maintain their position on the frontier and keep the friendship 
of the Indians, even furnished the Indians with supplies from the
®Smith, John Adams, II, 650.
l i l
disputed garrisons. The American position on the frontier was weak­
ened by the fact that the Indians refused to recognize the sovereignty 
'of the United States, the States’ militia organizations were unable 
to suppress Indian attacks on American settlements, and the Confeder­
ation Congress possessed neither the funds nor the authority to wage 
a campaign against the Indians. As a result, the frontier seethed 
with continuous strife throughout the Confederation era. If Adams 
was cognizant of Britain’s imperial policy, he did not record it for 
posterity. One historian asserts, though, that the British hoped to 
create a neutral barrier of Indian States within American territory 
in order to keep the Republic weak, to protect the fur trade, and to 
sustain the support of the Indiansj and that the policy was not aban- 
doned ty the British government until after the ¥ar of 1812.
Adams, while continuing to raise the question of the posts, 
devoted less attention to them after Lord Carmarthen flatly informed 
the American envoy, in the spring of 1?8$, that the British would not 
surrender the posts until the debts were paid. As a result, Adams 
turned to other matters. He sought indemnification for exportation 
of Negro slaves and other property from New York by the British after 
the Armistice, contrary to the seventh article of the peace treaty. 
Adams also sought to recover prize ships captured by English vessels 
after the end of hostilities in 1783- But Adams raised these issues
in vain. The British sought refuge from the American minister’s
/
demands for solutions to them behind the curtain of debt payments.
%emis. Jay’s Treaty, Chapter vi.
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In short, as Adams perceived it, the whole British Empire was stifling
accomodation with the United States until the debts were paid.
The envoy, despairing any fruitful negotiation, advised John
Jay, the Confederation's Foreign Affairs Secretary: advice is
. . . that every state law which concerns either debts or loyalists,
which can be impartially construed as contrary to the spirit of the
treaty of peace, be immediately repealed and the debtors left to
settle with their creditors or dispute the point of interest at law.
Adams' counsel did not sway, however, the Confederation Congress to
initiate ary American attempt to resolve the crisis.
At last, seeing the Anglo-American imbroglio beyond his power
to resolve, Adams requested recall. And while anticipating his return
to the New World after nearly a decade of diplomacy in the Old, Adams
contemplated retirement to his "little turnip yard and never quit 
11it again." He was disgusted with the maelstrom of European diplo­
macy and chagrined by his failure to secure a commercial treaty with 
the British. He longed to farm the rocky soil of his native Massa­
chusetts and badly needed to free himself from debt. But despite 
momentary despair John Adams eagerly looked forward to a responsible 
role in the federal government being erected' in his homeland, because
John Adams to John Jay, May 25, 1786, in C. F. Adams, The 
Works of John Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1856), VIII, 39h-39'6, 
hereafter cited as Adams, Works of John Adams.
^^John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, October 9, 1707, London, 
in Lester J. Cappon, ed.. The Adams-Jefferson Letters, 2 vols. 
(Chapel Hill, N, C., 1959), I, 202 , hereafter cited as Cappon, 
Adams-Jefferson Letters (Capitalization modernized in this thesis).
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Adams hoped that the new central government would be able to settle 
satisfactorily the disputes which divided the Anglo-American commun­
ity in 1787.
Leaving London in the spring of 1788 with virtually no diplo­
matic fruits to carry home was a stunning blow to Adams. The results 
of Adams’ mission were in sharp contrast to those victories at The 
Hague in 1781 and at Paris in 1783. But in all fairness to Adams, 
probably no American envoy could have succeeded during the Confedera­
tion era. The American states were divided, impotent and allied with 
France. Moreover, while the Americans needed accommodation with the 
British in the immediate post-war period, the British were disinter­
ested in rapprochement. England's paramount interests outside the
Empire were lodged in Europe--a Europe which in 1787 was poised for 
12war. Not until hostilities broke out on the Continent in 1792 did 
the English invite any serious attempts to resolve the stalemate.
^̂ Ibid., 203.
CHAPTER II: THE ANQLO-AMERICAH IMBROGLIO
CHAPTER II 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN IMBROGLIO
Fifty-three years old in 1788, Adams withdrew from the diplo­
matic scene of Europe never again to return. His departure from 
English shores in that year was a signal event not only in the life 
of the diplomat, but in the history of the United States as well.
The American states were at the threshold of union under a new con­
stitution, creating a central government that was to survive the 
flames of European conflict for a generation.
The establishment of a federal system with a resulting national 
government was to Adams the remedy needed to redress the trans-Atlantic 
grievances of the Americans. The seasoned diplomat, however, was 
somewhat displeased by the treaty-making power outlined in the con­
stitution. He lamented the fact that the Senate was to play a role 
in the nation's foreign relations. Adams advocated giving the Presi­
dent absolute power in this field.^ His own experience with the 
weaknesses of the Confederation's scheme of directing foreign affairs 
by committee convinced Adams that it was folly for the country to 
depend upon the temper and judgment of any group untutored in the
John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Quincy, November 15, I813, 
in Cappon, Adams-Jefferson Letters, II, ^00 ; see also "Three 
Letters to Roger Sherman on the Constitution of the United States," 
in Adams, Works of John Adams, VI, ^27-^36.
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subtle arts of diplomacy. Aside from this specific criticism, Adams 
admired the handiwork of the Philadelphia Convention, if for no other 
reason than it reflected on paper the political architecture Adams 
advocated in his Defense of the Constitutions of the United States 
of America, a three-volumed histoiy of republics which Adams wrote 
while in London as minister. Moreover, the former diplomat expected 
to serve under the new government.
Mithin the framework of the Constitution, the vice-presidency 
was the post Adams eagerly sought. Though he considered himself 
worthy of the chief magistracy, Adams was mindful of the fact that 
George Washington of Virginia was destined to be the first President. 
Therefore, it was to the first elections under the federal government 
that Adams devoted his attention during the autumn and winter of 
1788. The campaign which ensued was a significant prelude to the 
intensification of party spirit which was to dominate American diplo­
matic intercourse with the British during Washington’s administrations.
Adams faced a formidable task when he presented himself as a 
candidate for the second office by spurning a Senate seat in the new
upper chamber and by declining the presidency of the moribund Con-
2federation Congress. There were presidential candidates in nearly 
every State. Moreover, despite the fact that Adams was readily 
respected for his services to the nation during and after the Revo­
lution he was not a popular figure after he returned from the Old
^Ghinard, Honest John Adams, p. 222; John Adams to Theophilous 
Parsons, Braintree, November 2, 1788, in Adams, Works of John Adams, 
VIII,
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World. His three-volumed magnum opus, which was read by many of his 
contemporaries, revealed an enigmatic political philosophy that was 
widely misconstrued as un-republican, Adams was short, rotund and 
he wore curled hair in an era when true republicans had shorn their 
locks.^ He was personally cold, often rude and disinterested in 
idle conversation. In short, John Adams was not an inspiring figure 
to people who gaped in awe before the grave and taciturn Washington.
To what extent his physical characteristics and political 
ideas affected the election in 1788 is not readily discernible, yet 
Adams often noted that he did not possess an attractive image.^ But 
it was in the political arena, exposed publicly to the vicissitudes 
of backbiting and acrimony, when Adams despaired. Adams was a novice 
to politics. He was extremely sensitive to criticism and he seldom 
restrained from replying to his critics in language devoid of tact. 
Adams was accused of harboring monarchial and aristocratic tenden­
cies, he was censured for failing to negotiate a commercial accord 
with Great Britain, and he was vilified for not giving his unqualified 
endorsement of the new Constitution. But the active center of opposi­
tion to Adams’ candidacy was in the hands of a persistent enemy.
In New York a group of bankers and brokers, under the leadership
3john Adams to Benjamin Rush, December 11, l8ll, in Adams,
Works of John Adams, X, 11.
^See in particular John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 1, 1796, 
Philadelphia, in The Adams Papers, "Letters Received and other Loose 
Papers,”Massacbusetta Historical Society, microfilm edition, 608 reels, 
ed. by L. H. Butterfield (Boston, 195^-19^9), hereafter cited as Adams 
Papers (Capitalization modernized by the author of this thesis).
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of Alexander Hamilton, was attempting to gather support to place a 
pliable figure in the vice-presidency. Hamilton, a brilliant laixyer, 
was an astute politician who formerly served as Washington's aide- 
de-camp. Hamilton feared the potential influence that Adams might 
have in the new government. Assured by Heniy Knox, Hamilton's emis­
sary in New England, that Adams enjoyed considerable local 
support north of New York the shrewd attorney lent aid to Adams' 
candidacy during the election of the presidential electors, then 
strove to reduce the number of votes cast for Adams by encouraging 
the electors to spread their ballots over the field of vice-presi­
dential aspirants. The upshot of this chicanery resulted in Adams' 
election by only a plurality.^
Adams never understood Hamilton's motives for waging a spirited 
campaign against the former diplomat's candidacy, though he perceived 
his adversary's efforts as "damnable m a l i c e . A n d  characteristic of 
Adams' sensitivity to the opposition and criticism which accompanied 
his election, the first vice-president angrily cried that he would 
resign the office except that by doing so he might endanger the whole 
fabric of the new government. Apparently Hamilton was satisfied that 
Adams was chastised by the outcome of the election.
If Adams expected the vice-presidency to place him in a position
%annxng J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Boston, 19^3)> p. 83, 
hereafter cited as Dauer, ¥5e Adams' Beij'eralists; Joseph Charles, The 
Origins of the American Party System (fell'iamsburg, 1956), pp. 56-5*7, 
hereafter cited as Charles, Origins of the American Party System.
^Quoted in ibid., p. 56.
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of great responsibilityj he was sadly mistaken. By a fate which Adams 
could not anticipate in 1788 the second office of the land became an 
honorific benefice which soon earned the immortal epitaph from its 
first incumbents "Ify country, has in its wisdom, contrived for me the 
most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or 
his imagination c o n c e i v e d . Relegating Adams to an obscure corner 
in the Federal area was largely the result of Hamiltonian handiwork 
and Washingtonian quiessence. Hamilton purposely fought to reduce 
Adams' influence in the new government during the election,® and 
Washington, prone to literal interpretations of the Constitution, saw 
only two powers enumerated for the vice-presidency— as speaker of the 
Senate and as a successor to a dead President. Adams felt entitled 
to membership in a policy-formulating body such as the Cabinet. In­
stead, he was given a coraraissionership on Hamilton's Sinking Fund; a 
cruel blow to a man whose knowledge of foreign affairs was legion, 
but whose interest in public finance was negligible.
The elections of 1788, in which Adams was so deeply involved, 
were staged against a backdrop of European events that were soon to 
envelop the American scene. And as Adams entered upon the duties of 
his new post in the spring of 1789, the eyes of America were focused 
upon the disintegration of the ancien regime in France.
The internal strife which engulfed France in 1789 was warmly
7john Adams to Abigail Adams, December 19, 1793» Adams Papers. 
^Charles, Origins of the American Party System, p. 57.
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received by most Americans. But the vice-president predicted that 
the French were incapable of creating democratic institutions over­
night to be perpetuated forever. Adams correctly assessed the path 
of the French Revolution. As he predicted the National Convention 
usurped the political power of the French state, an act which event­
ually led to the indiscriminate execution of nobles and the tyranni­
cal rule of King Mob.^
In 1790, while France was undergoing the vicissitudes of 
revolution. President Washington sent Gouveneur Morris, a wealtl^ 
businessman, to London as unofficial successor to Adams. The vice- 
president’s replacement was much better armed than Adams. The Fed­
eral Constitution gave the central government sovereign power in 
treating with foreign nations, a weapon which Adams needed, but did 
not have, when he was minister.
Morris impressed upon Lord Carmarthen (now the Duke of Leeds) 
the authority of Congress in all matters concerning foreign commerce. 
He assured Leeds also that the United States would uphold its obliga­
tions under the peace treaty, by pointing out that Congress was 
already repealing all laws contrary to the Treaty. Moreover, Morris 
explained the absolute inability of the federal government to insure 
that every debt was collectible since maty of them were unrecoverable. 
Leeds replied that the British would not withdraw from the disputed 
garrisons until the position was regularized. He suggested fair com­
pensation. TiJhen Morris broached the subject of a commercial treaty
9John Adams to Abigail Adams, December 19, 1793l Adams Papers.
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Leeds was attentive and interested but failed to offer a definite 
proposal. Morris’ warm reception by the English government and Leeds’ 
interest in negotiations was the result of what the British thought 
to be the apparent Congressional desire to resolve the issues which 
plagued the Adams m i s s i o n . T h e  Federal Constitution ended most of 
the commercial warfare among the States and American businessmen were 
anxious to benefit as much as possible from Anglo-American commerce.
In sharp contrast to the failure of Adams, Morris’ mission 
produced one concession from the British government. In March, 1791, 
the Committee of the Council on Trade submitted a report recommending 
commercial negotiations with the Americans, though it recognized that 
the United States stood to lose more in a trade war than Great Bri­
tain.
While Morris was in London, England and Spain became embroiled 
over a trading area in the Nootka Sound in the Pacific Northwest. The 
Nootka Sound controversy alarmed the American government, because it 
was believed in Philadelphia that if an Anglo-Spanish war ensued, the 
British might attempt to move troops over American soil to spearhead 
an attack upon Spanish-held Louisiana.
In deference to Adams' previous official contacts with the 
English he was asked by Washington to express his opinion as to what 
courses of action should be taken by the United States in the event 
the British attempted to use American soil as a base for military
^%ard and Gooch, History of British Foreign Policy, I, 
lllbid., 15%.
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operations. It was Adams' viewpoint that the Americans should not 
permit English troops to cross the Republic’s soil. But in the event 
that Britain violated American soil, the Vice-President suggested that 
the United States not become involved in hostilities. In the first 
place Adams did not believe there would be any sizeable public support 
for war. Secondly, the government néithei’i-possessed, the strength to com­
mand men nor the money to prosecute a war unless the necessity of it 
was agreed to by all. The Vice-President advised, instead, that if 
British troops passed through American territory the United States 
should remonstrate in London. Adams’ advice was probably based on 
his desire to see the British commit themselves to a gross violation 
of the nation’s sovereignty in the hope that as a result the English
would be compelled to redress other grievances of the United States
1 ?in order to satisfy the loss of American honor. Whether or not 
Adams’ position was practicable was sidetracked by the fact that the 
crisis passed before any action was needed on the part of the Amer­
ican government.
As the Nootka Sound crisis passed into history, Adams’ atten­
tion was focused upon an attempt in Congress to discriminate against 
British goods. England’s commercial discrimination against American 
shipping and goods became a paramount issue in Congress because the 
Revolutionary government in France was granting trade concessions to 
the United States. Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, reported
12John Adams to George Washington, August 29, 1790, in Adams,
Works of John Adams, VIII, ,̂97,
26
to Congress in 1791 that about sixty-one per cent of American whale 
oil was being sold in France. Virtually none was being exported to 
Great Britain. Moreover, the French opened their ports in the West 
Indies and were importing two-thirds of New England's codfish produc­
tion. Jefferson suggested that Congress grant preferential duties 
to French imports. In the House of Representatives, James Madison of 
Virginia, while advocating most favored treatment for the French, 
called for higher duties against English goods and ships. It was 
Madison's plan to discriminate against British shipping in the hope 
of forcing England to grant reciprocal trading privileges to Ameri­
cans. The Hamiltonians in Congress, though anxious to secure a 
greater share of the French trade, were not anxious to stop the 
existing flow of Anglo-American commerce. Their position was an­
chored to the fact that the English trade comprised eighty per cent 
of all American trade, and that the duties collected from British 
ships and goods were needed to support the national fiscal program. 
The stability of the federal government was tied to this revenue. 
Madison was not attacking the English trade, but the absence of 
reciprocity in the oceanic commerce.
Adams was opposed to Madison's position. The Vice-President 
supported Hamilton’s fiscal program and he saw in the Virginian's 
plan the possibility that it might not work. Adams was mindful of 
the fact that the British, while anxious to trade with the United 
States, would lose less in a trade war than the Americans. Moreover, 
the Vice-President realized that American merchants were dependent
27
on a supply of English credit.Madison’s proposals, however, aroused 
English interest in possible American discrimination against British 
goods and ships. As a result Great Britain sent George Hammond, a 
career diplomat, to the United States in the autumn of 1791 to nego­
tiate not only the questions Which were never resolved by Adams in 
London but a commercial treaty as well. Madison dropped his proposals 
when the news of Hammond's appointment reached American shores.
The English envoy brought with him instructions to settle the 
question of the frontier posts and to resolve the debt claims of the 
British merchants. If the American government was anxious to proceed 
with commercial negotiations, Hammond was to secure most favored 
nation treatment for English goods and ships. And if possible the 
envoy was to secure a promise that existing duties on imports from 
England would not be raised. Similar treatment was to be offered to 
American goods and vessels in exchange. Yet, Hammond was not to con­
cede any American demand for trade into colonial ports, including the 
West Indies.
Hammond was welcomed by the new government, and became inti­
mately acquainted with Alexander Hamilton, who was serving as Washing­
ton’s Secretary of the Treasury. The envoy soon learned that Hamilton 
was interested in seeing the British government grant Americans the
^^Dauer, The Adams Federalists, p. 83.
Ï^Bernard Mayo, ed.. Instructions to British Ministers to the 
United States, 1791-1812 (Washington, 19iiTJ, pp. ^-8, hereafter cited 
as Mayo, Instructions to British Ministers.
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right to trade in the West Indies, if only in small c raft.Aside 
from informal and unoffiçtal dealings with Hamilton, no commercial 
negotiations were undertaken in 1792 because Hammond's time was de­
voted to the interminable questions of debts and compensation, alleged 
failures of the States to accept the Peace Treaty as the law of the 
land, and the garrisons on American territory.
Throughout 1792 and part of 1793 Hammond negotiated with Thomas 
Jefferson, the Secretary of State. Jefferson's position on the ques­
tion of the debts and frontier posts was not unlike the stand which
Adams took during the Vice-President's London mission.Consequently,
17Hammond reiterated the Carmarthen policy. Jefferson's principal aim 
was to encourage the British to surrender the forts. He pointed out 
that English fears regarding debt collection were largely groundless. 
British subjects were free to use American courts to recover their 
debts, and that both Congress and the Federal courts were demonstrat­
ing good faith by invalidating confiscation acts and unholding debt 
claims.
Apart from his official dealings with Jefferson the English 
envc^ conferred with Hamilton on an informal basis. There is no evi­
dence to indicate that Hamilton sought to subvert Jefferson's position, 
but it was apparent from Hammond's dispatches that Hamilton eagerly
^^Ward and Gooch, History of British Foreign Policy, I, 1^$;
^^Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond, Philadelphia, May 29, 
1792, in Bartlett, American Diplomacy, pp. 68-73.
Hammond to Jefferson, March 5, 1792, in ibid., pp. 66-68.
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sought GOimercial arrangements which would permit some American trade 
in the British West Indies. Hamilton and Hammond were intimates and 
the envoy was often made privy to Cabinet discussions. In this matter, 
Hamilton's actions were improper and paved the way, in part, for 
Jefferson's retirement from office in 1793. Since no action was 
undertaken by either Hammond or Jefferson to draft a commercial treaty 
in 1792, their discussions remained centered on Ihfeb'ther ;grievances which 
paralyzed Adams' mission six years before.. But both men were strap­
ped to their viewpoints and the imbroglio remained unresolved. On 
the other hand, the French were granting additional commercial con­
cessions to Americans daily.
Throughout 1792 France was purchasing vast amounts of food 
stuffs and naval stores from Americans, using credits in exchange on 
debts to the French government from the days of the American Revolu­
tion. Furthermore, the miniscule French merchant marine was incapable 
of handling the trade, and as a result Americans were granted the 
carriage of almost all French West Indian produce. The upshot of the 
increased commerce with France and the Indies was the first economic 
boom in a generation. From this point until the War of 1812 the eco­
nomic development of the nation was tied to international trade and 
shipping.l^
The revival in oceanic commerce between America and Europe 
(which had been the k^stone to the colonial econony) was welcomed
G. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790- 
1860 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 19^9), p. IjST
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by Adams, but he was alarmed by the increasing division among Americans
over the path of the French Revolution. Political labels were gaining
considerable favor. The two major political factions— those who
favored and those who opposed the Federal Constitution in 178? and
1788— which existed in the later years of the Confederation were
melting into oblivion. In their place two new groups were congealing.
One faction, calling themselves Federalists, was dominated by the
mercantile community on the Atlantic seaboard. Hamilton assumed
19nominal leadership of this group. This faction was alarmed by the 
excesses of the French Revolution and it roundly condemned the whole­
sale execution of the aristocracy in France. Opposing this faction 
was a group which took the labels of Republican and Democratic-Repub­
lican. The Republican faction was nearly without leadership, though 
James Madison was often recognized as its spokesman in the House.
This party considered the Revolution in France a holy cause for lib­
erty and it believed the United States should support the Republican 
successors of Louis XVI. The events in France, though, only magnified 
the presence of party spirit which was first manifested in Adams' 
campaign for the vice-presidency. The Republicans chafed under a 
government dominated ty Hamilton. They were opposed to the Hamilton­
ian fiscal scheme, which appeared to Republicans as a device to enrich 
the wealthy. Th^ were aggravated by the inability of the government to 
wring.cpimercial concessions from the British, and they were enraged
^^Charles, Origins of the American Party System, pp. 7-36.
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by the failure of the government to eject British troops from American 
soil.
Adams was opposed to party divisions, and he saw in them the 
seeds of dissension and tyranny. He insisted that many Americans 
were erroneously comparing the principles of the French Revolution 
with those of the American. And in a series of articles which he en­
titled ''Discourses on Davila"the Vice-President reminded his fellow 
citizens that the French were doomed unless their government was 
based on political equilibrium that permitted all classes to be 
represented. Adams insisted that the United States would remain 
politically secure only if it continued to maintain the proper bal­
ance between the three branches of government and the two hoii^s of 
21Congress.
Adams’ "Discourses," published in 1791 in a Republican newspaper,
were injurious to himv Though the Vice-President did not consider
himself a party man, he was associated with Hamilton's faction since
Adams favored a strong government and supported the existing fiscal
policies. The Hamiltonian Federalists disclaimed Adams because they
22saw in his "Discoursed a perfpheral attack upon the Constitution.
20see Marcus Cunliffe, The Nation Takes Shapes 1789-1837 
(Chicago, 19^9), pp. 27^28,for a succinct analysis of the checkered 
career of party labels in the Federalist era. See Charles, Origins 
of the American Party %stem. Chapters i and ii for a convincing " 
argument as to the seeds of partisan strife before Jay's Treaty.
"Discourses on Davila," in Adams, Works of John Adams, VI,
232.
22charles, Origins of the American Party System, p. 70.
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The Republicans scourged the Vice-President for his attack upon the 
French Revolution»
The Vice-President was shocked by his readers' misinterpretation 
of the"Discoursesmessage. He brooded over the failure of his coun­
trymen to appreciate his valuable services to the American Revolution 
and he lamented the fact that he was confined to that apex of ennui—  
the second office— which promised so much and produced so little. 
Nonetheless, in 1792 Adams was re-elected to the vice-presidency, and 
this time by a comfortable majority. Hamilton’s faction supported 
Adams in 1792 to keep George Clinton, a staunch Republican from New 
York, from being elected.
John Adams entered the second term of his vice-presidency 
shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-British war in 1793. The 
legacy of the unresolved Anglo-American imbroglio remained, now to be 
augmented with the problems of neutrality, contraband, and sea power 
— problems which Adams attempted to mitigate in his draft treaty while 
he was in England. Moreover, the war between the great powers was 
brought into sharp focus in the United States because in France the 
war came in the wake of the execution of America’s benefactor, Louis 
XVI, and the proclamation of the French Republic.
While Adams wished that his fellow Americans could remain 
neutral and profit from the sale of food stuffs and naval stores to
^̂ Sraith, John Adams, II, 802.
^^Charles, Origins of the American Party System, p. 57<
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the warring powers,he realized that American neutrality would be
26"a very difficult thing to maintain." He knew that the British navy 
would strangle American shipping to France in the hope of starving the 
"armed nation," Furthermore, the Vice-President was certain that the 
English would attempt to conquer the French islands in the Caribbean,
27and send American ships back to their home ports. It was even con­
ceivable that the United States might be allied with the French in a 
war with the English. Indeed, it was felt in London that American 
sympathy was overwhelmingly on the French side and it was known that 
the United States was bound by a defensive treaty to protect French 
possessions in the Caribbean. The initial move taken by the French 
government, after the war declaration, was intended to sway the United 
States away from economic dependence upon Britain. In January, 1793, 
the National Convention opened all ports in the Indies to American 
ships and goods. And in order to secure continued good will, the 
French sent a brilliant and enthusiastic young envoy, Edmond Genet, 
to represent the Republic in Philadelphia.
The impending arrival of Genêt in the United States presented 
a delicate problem involving the Franco-American alliance and the 
reception of the new envoy. Hamilton and Jefferson, while both agree­
ing that neutralily was the only practicable course of action open to
% o h n  C. Miller, The Federalist Era: 1789-1601 (New York, 
i960), p. lltO, hereafter cited as Miller, Federalist Era.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, February 27, 1793, Adams Papers.
27ibid.
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the United States, differed on the question of which branch of govern­
ment— the executive or the legislative— possessed the power to declare 
neutrality. Hamilton contended that the President was responsible, 
Jefferson asserted that the power was Congress* alone. The Treasury 
Secretary also desired to see the French treaty of 1778 suspended 
until a ̂  facto government, not fighting for its existence, was su­
preme in France. On the other hand, the Secretary of State contended 
that treaties are contracted between powers and not governments and 
that the United States was bound to uphold the French accord.
As the controversy raged between Hamilton and Jefferson, Tench 
Coxe, a friend of both Hamilton and Adams who worked in the Treasury 
department, wrote the Vice-President for an opinion to substantiate 
Hamilton's position. Adams replied cautiously that the decision was 
up to the Presidents "I have no constitutional vote in it, I there­
fore protest against taking any side in it or having ny name or
28opinion quoted about it," The Vice-President feared offending any
of the warring powers, and he was privately inclined to believe that
Hamilton's position was the safest. Treaties were concluded on the
basis that "both nations will remain nearly the same and the interests
of both parties not essentially changed? not that one party will turn
the world upside down. Any total change of interests made by the act
of God or by the act of one of the parties," he continued, "will dis-
29charge the other from all moral obligations to fulfill the treaty."
^%ohn Adams to Tench Coxe, April 2^, 1793, Adams Papers. 
29lbid.
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Adams considered the question of American neutrality a matter 
of expediency rather than morality. *'A neutrality, absolute, total 
neutrality, is our only hope." Besides, Adams did not consider the 
revolutionary regime in France capable of holding its own against the 
combined forces of crowned Europe.
The Vice-President’s viewpoint was not vindicated by Washing­
ton’s actions. The President compromised the conflicting positions 
of Hamilton and Jefferson by initiating a neutrality proclamation 
without consulting Congress and agreed to receive officially the new 
French envoy who disembarked in Charleston Harbor in June, 1793.
Adams was in Quincy when Genet arrived in Philadelphia in early 
July. And he watched the crisis which overcame the capital with de­
tachment. Genêt schemed with George Rogers Clark, an alcoholic and
former Revolutionaiy general-hero, to launch an attack on Spanish
31colonial possessions adjacent to the United States. He issued let­
ters -Of -marque to many idle American ship captains anxious to prey on 
British ships. Genet established extra-territorial prize courts to 
confina prize awards of English ships taken by the privateers. The 
envoy also founded the Democratic-Republican societies which were 
fueled by enthusiasm for the French Republic and membered by its most 
ardent supporters, . He sought an advance from Hamilton upon money due 
France in order to finance his grandiose military plans and he attempted
30lbid,
^^Frederick J. Turner, ed.. Correspondence of the French Minis­
ters ^  United States, 1791-179T(Wa8hington, 'WoJT» pp. 2Ï6-B17, 
B23, 232-233% Gilbert C. Din, "Colonizacfbn en la Luisiana Espanola en 
el siglo dieciocho," an unpublished doctoral dissertation (University 
of Madrid, i960), Cha#ter i.
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to borrow American cannon from Henry Knox, the Secretary of War. 
Hamilton denied Genet’s plea for funds and Knox informed the envcy that 
the United States would not loan him a pistol. The French minis­
ter’s machination finally was stifled- when Genêt was indicted by two 
Federalists (Rufus King and John Jay) for threatening the authority 
of Washington. The news of Genêt’s perfidy brought in its wake the 
temporary downfall of the societies and an immediate request for the 
envoy's recall by an unanimous Cabinet. The Genêt episode ended 
with the arrival of his replacement, Joseph Fauchet, who bore Genêt's 
death warrant. A generous Washington permitted the in^assioned ex­
envoy to remain in the United States,
The arrival of Genêt in America coincided with the inception 
of British confiscation of American ships in the Caribbean. In an 
attempt to keep French produce and American exports from reaching the 
ports of France by the way of the French Indies, the British sent a 
fleet to the Caribbean armed with authority to stop the flow of enemy 
commerce. On June 8, 1793, an Order-in-Council was issued by the 
English government, invoking the Rule of 1756 (trade which is not 
open to a nation in peace cannot be opened in war) and declaring it 
to be Britain’s right to detain neutral vessels carrying foodstuffs 
and naval stores to any port controlled by France. In turn, the 
British would purchase the cargoes from its owners. The Order-in- 
Council was followed by unofficial news that the English were
^^Alexander Be Conde, Entangling Alliances Politics and Diplo­
macy Under George Washington (Durham, H. C., 1958), p. 23^.
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sponsoring a trace between Portugal and Algiers, which would free the 
Portuguese Na’vy to fight with England and would leave the Algerines 
free to raid American shipping. As a result of the actions taken by 
the British, American ships in the Caribbean were confiscated by the 
dozens and the Mediterranean Sea was virtually closed to American 
vessels.
The downfall of Qenât was nearly completed by the time Adams
returned to Philadelphia in December, 1793. Adams noticed that the
political climate had changed during the Congressional recess. The
Republicans controlled the lower house and increased its numbers in
the Senate. **The spirit of party is very subtle although very violent," 
33Adams remarked. He was anguished by the faction of "Anti-Federalists" 
who were attacking the President’s neutrality policy. And he was 
amazed by the influence they possessed over the populace. It seemed 
to Adams that the government was in a critical situation and he as­
signed all blame to the Francophiles, "The Anti-Federalist party by
their ox feasts, their civic feasts, their King-killing toasts, their 
perpetual insolence and billings-gate against all nations and govern­
ments in Europe, their everlasting brutal cry of tyranny, despots, 
and combinations against liberty, etc., etc., etc., have probably 
irritated, offended, and provoked all the crowned heads of Europe at 
last; and a little more of this indelicacy and indecency may involve 
us in a war with all the world.
ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, January 12, 179b, Adams Papers.
^%ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, December 22, 1793, Adams Papers.
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"No prospect of peace in Europê , and therefore none of internal 
harmot̂ r in America" was Adams’ preview of 179b.^ The incessant attacks 
on American shipping hy the English was intensifying party spirit in 
the capital* The Francophiles in Congress and in the streets prated 
the virtues of the French wars and celebrated every victory of arms 
over the British. And for every spoliation of a merchant vessel by 
the Royal Nayy, Republican political capital increased. The Federalists 
were stymied; they could not endorse the British and they would not 
embrace the French. The Federalists, Adams pointed out, were ’’more 
afraid of the friendship of France than of the enmity of England.
Because of their refusal to embrace the French, the Federalists 
were being labeled by their political opponents as the pro-British 
party. The Federalists, in fact, remained staunch supporters of 
Washington’s neutrality policy, and their Anglophile proclivities, 
if any, were far less pronounced than the "Frenchified zealots," as
3Adams described them.
The Federalist position was not aided by news that the French
Vohn Adams to Abigail Adams, January 9, 179h, Adams Papers. 
John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 8, 179U, Adams Papers. 
3john Adams to Abigail Adams, Januaiy 12, 179b, Adams Papers.
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also were attacking American ships. Despite the French depredations, 
the Anti “Federalist faction was vocal. Even Gent's short-lived 
societies were being reorganized to vilify the administration's neu­
trality policy, Adams roundly condemned the societies' incessant 
attacks on the President and the government. While he believed the 
clubs were legal the Vice-President censured them for attempting "to 
ruin l^ashington's] character, destroy his peace, and injure his 
health.
But the British and French attacks on American ships were only 
part of the scene in which the party spirit found fuel for its fires.
In the Northwest, south of the disputed posts, Indians were attacking 
American settlements with disquieting daring and regularity. Moreover, 
General Anthony Wayne, whose paltry forces were attempting to subdue 
the Indians, was beset with expiring enlistments, seditious officers, 
and poor supplies.^ On the Atlantic the Algerines were capturing 
American ships, confiscating cargoes and imprisoning sailors, leading 
Madison, the Republican leader in Congress, to conclude that the British 
purposely encouraged the Algerines to plunder American shipping.^ In 
short, as Adams lamented, "we cannot be in a more desperate situation 
than we are with all Europe, with all Indians and Barbaiy States."?
^Ibid.
^Walter Lowrie and Matthew Clark, American State Papers, 6 Vols. 
(Washington, I832-3U), Microcord edition, Indian"Alfairs. I, 3&3* 
hereafter cited as Lowrie and Clark, American State^Papers.
filler. Federalist Era, p. iĥ o
?John Adams to Abigail Adams, January 9, 179b, Adams Papers.
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But Adams was convinced that Washington was equal to the tasks of 
keeping the nation free from disunion and neutral in war.
The Vice-Pfesident’s attention was focused at the beginning 
of the year on two events which appeared pregnant with political sig­
nificance. First of all, Jefferson resigned from office and secondly, 
the Secretary of State left a valedictory on foreign commerce. Adams 
perceived Jefferson’s departure from the government as an attempt on 
the part of the Virginian to allow his reputation to grow until a 
clamor was raised for him to succeed Washington. The Vice-President 
explored and condemned Jefferson’s motives. ". . . He is indolent 
and his soul is poisoned with ambition.”  ̂ But Adams approved the 
precedent that Jefferson set because he expected to use it himself. 
Adams thought that Jefferson was embittered against the Constitution 
and the government, that his mind was "poisoned with passion, preju­
dice and faction.
Unquestionably, Adams considered Jefferson his rival for the 
Presidency. He even envisioned a political maneuver that would frus­
trate Jefferson’s alleged ambition. "I am almost tempted to wish he
(jeffersonJ may be chosen Vice-President at the next election, for
11there if he could do no good, he could do no harm." And it would
free the presidency for Adams if Washington departed.
^ i d .
^John Adams to Abigail Adams, December 26, 1793, Adams Papers. 
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, January 6, 1793, Adams Papers, 
lllbid.
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Jefferson's report on American commercial intercourse td-th
foreign nations was looked upon by Adams and the Federalists as a
12partisan rebuttal to the administration’s policies» Reduced to 
resolution by Madison in the House of Representatives, the proposi­
tions were, in the main, American-styled Navigation Acts. They were 
tailored to discriminate against the English trade because there was 
no Anglo-American commercial accord, and designed to encourage more
French trade since the fighting republic was granting concessions to
13American shipping. The purpose of Jefferson’s recommendations, and 
Madison’s resolves, was to nurse Franco-American commerce at the ex­
pense of the British. In doing so both hoped to wring concessions 
from England while not at the same time alienate the friendship of 
France.
Adams firmly denounced Madison’s resolutions. The Vice-Presi­
dent considered it pointless to attempt to regulate oceanic trade 
when all powers were ravishing American ships with indiscriminate 
ease.^^ Moreover, Adams considered Madison’s resolves highly parti­
san and a threat to Washington’s neutrality policy. The Federalists 
closed ranks in opposition to Madison’s resolves because they were 
opposed to a "war of trade legislation." William Smith, a South 
Carolinian Federalist, fashioned his party’s rebuttal from Hamilton’s
^%ohn Adams to John Quincy Adams, April 3, 179b, Adams Papers.
^%oseph Vales, comp.. Debates and Proceedings in the Congress 
of the United States, 1789-182%, 1:2 vols. (Washington, l83ÏÏ̂ lB̂ (ï), III, 
ï^^-1^8, hereafter cited as Annals.
^^John Adams to John Quincy Adams, April 3, 179b, Adams Papers.
report on mannfacttirers. Smith reasoned that Madison’s proposals wonld 
endanger the government’s stability and fiscal integrity ty stifling 
English trade. In the end, the Federalists prevailed and Madison’s
I'dcoramericial propositions were defeated.
While Adams followed the debates in the House over Madison’s 
resolves, the Vice-President’s chamber was engaged in a heated fight 
over Albert Gallatin, a Swiss-born Republican Senator from Pennsylvania. 
The Federalists were attempting to unseat Gallatin because the Pennsyl­
vanian sought to investigate Hamilton’s bailiwick, the Treasury depart­
ment. It was a signal event for the Federalist leadership in the 
Senate. Beforehand, the Hamiltonian faction limited its partisan 
activities to thwarting anti-Administration legislation. How the 
Federalists were taking the initiative to protect Hamilton, Gallatin 
lost his seat, as a result of Federalist action, believing that Adams
16would have voted for him if there had been a tie. On the contrary, 
the Vice-President was pleased that the Federalists prevailed.
Adams was not denouncing Gallatin, but he was condemning the Penn^l- 
vanian’s political associations.
Adams supported Washington’s policies and Hamilton’s fiscal 
program. To the Vice-President an investigation of the latter was an 
attack on the former. Adams was unable to perceive any benefit from
l^Annals, III, U3I.
A. Carroll and ¥. W. Ashworth, George Washington: First 
in Peace (New York, 1957), p. 158 N., hereafter cited as Carroll and 
Ashworth, George Washington.
17lbid.
impinging the Administration’s course of action. This attitude of 
Adams was the key to the Vice-President’s political bias. He con­
sidered himself above party spirit and he felt duty bound to support 
the administration in power.
The first tie-breaking vote Adams case in 179Ü clearly indi­
cated his unswerving loyalty to Washington and, significantly, his 
support of policies now clearly identified with the Federalist party.
The Vice-President broke a tie vote in February, 179Ü, to enact an
1 g
anti-filibustering statute sponsored by the Federalists. The legis­
lation developed from attempts on the part of General Clark and Edmond 
Gênât to mount an attack on Spanish Florida. The Spanish commissioner’s 
complaint concerning Clark’s activities, coupled with the fear that 
the General’s Jacobin Arny would precipitate a war between the United 
States and Spain, left Adams enraged at those who were ’continually
committing some intemperance of indiscretion or tending to defeat all
19our precautions to keep peace. Adams was stunned personally by
Clark’s treasonous association with the malcontents, but the affair
only reconfirmed the Vice-President’s lifelong fear and distrust of
20military personnel.
At the tail end of the Clark episode Adams’ attention was di­
verted by three ominous events that brought the United States close to 
war with Great Britain and which presaged the extraordinary mission of
A n n a l s , HI, 66-69.
^%ohn Adams to John Quincy Adams, May 26, 179b, Adams Papers. 
2nJohn Adams to Abigail Adams, February 9, 179b, Adams Papers.
John Jay to London to resolve the Anglo-American imbroglio. First of 
all, a report of Thomas Pinckney, the American minister, in London, 
arrived relating the ■unwillingness of the British government to renew 
negotiations over the Peace Treaty infractions by both nations. Be­
sides, the new Foreign Secretary Baron Grenville resisted Pinckney's 
pleas for a bi-national mediation of the Indian crisis on the American 
frontier. Thirdly, in late March, Pinckney's letters revealed that 
nearly two hundred fifty American vessels were captured in the British
West Indies, under a secret Order-in-Council issued by the English
2*1ministry in November. Finally, unofficial news was received from 
the frontier that the Canadian Governor-General, Lord Dorchester, 
while addressing a council of Indian chieftains, predicted that hos­
tilities were about to break out between the British and the Americans. 
Moreover, it was believed that Dorchester invited the Indians to ally 
themselves with the British in order to recover lands sold to American 
citizens.
Adams queried: Did England actually intend to force the United
States out of its neutral position? Were the British purposely driving
^iLowrie and Clark, American State Papers, Foreign Relations,
1, '31̂ , 328, b29. On November 6,1793, the Privy Council issued the 
secret Order-in-Council which authorized British ships-of-war to seize 
and condemn all neutral ships carrying provisions to the French Indies. 
To ensure that the bag of American ships would be as large as possible, 
the order was kept secret from Pinckney until late December. Of the 
total captured 150 were detained by the British. See Mayo, Instruc­
tions to British Ministers, pp.
^%emls. Jay's Treaty, p. 176; Mayo, Instructions to British 
Ministers, pp. ?1w 5n , Dorchester spoke at Quebec and he~*3id not 
expect his speech to be publicized. Many Canadians assumed that war 
between the United States and Great Britain was imminent.
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the Americans into the French o r b i t ? T h e  Vice-President was under­
standably alarmed. While he recorded no reactions to Grenville's 
reluctance to continue negotiations with Pinckney, Adams must have 
been dismayed because the necessity for an immediate settlement of 
Anglo-American differences appeared to be the only course open to both 
sides that would prevent a rapture. And as a result of England's un­
precedented and unheralded attack on American shipping in the Caribbean 
under the November Order-in-Council, Adams believed that it was only 
a matter of time before the British conquered all the French Indies 
and in doing so invited war by virtually halting American commerce 
with the French colonies, bringing an end to all American trade so 
vitally important to the Republic's economy.Possibly, Dorchester 
revealed, in his public address to the Indians, a forthcoming declara­
tion of war from London. The strength of Dorchester's contingent in 
Canada was not known in the United States. Actually, the Governor-
General commanded six thousand regulars. With the support of the
25
Indians, the Canadians possessed a formidable task force.
To Adams war was unthinkable. "The havoc made in our trade 
will distress us," yet the nation must not go to war because "nothing 
is to be dreaded so much as that."^^ A war would bring an end to the
John Adams to Adrian Van Der Kamp, February 18, 17914, in 
Carroll and Ashworth, George Washington, 157N. No copy of this letter 
in the Adams Papers.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, February 8, 179k, Adams Papers.
^%lller. Federalist Era, pp. II45-II46.
John Adams to Abigail Adams, February 8, 119k, Adams Papers.
hi
Constitution and possibly to the United States as well. Twenty years 
of revolution and diplomacy to free Americans from the British Empire 
and to establish an enlightened republic would face the fate of a 
partitioned Poland if an unsuccessful war was waged against an England 
that was mistress of the seas and master on the frontier.
As a result of the three-pronged menace to American interests
— intransigence in Whitehall^ depredations at sea and imminent war on
the frontier— the Federalists itarshailed their forces in Congress to
sponsor vigorous defense legislation. In the House, the Federalists
proposed a naval construction bill authorizing the creation of a six
frigate navy to suppress the Algerines. Predictably the Republicans,
who were eager to legislate economic coercion, were not anxious to
support any of the measures put forth by their political opponents.
Indicative of Republican opposition to this measure was Madison's
quixotic rebuttal that the United States could hire the Portuguese
navy to defend American shipping after the peace lapsed between
27Portugal and Algiers. President Washington, on the advice of Hamil­
ton, called for raising and equipping an army of thirty thousand men 
and the construction of fortifications sufficiently strong to resist 
anything short of a seige. To these suggestions the Republicans re­
mained silent in order to avoid attacking the President and to keep 
from being labeled as pacifists. Instead, the Republicans spear­
headed an investigation of the Treasury in the wake of Gallatin's 
earlier defeat, thereby revealing their complete contempt for the
^^Annals, III, 2^0; Smith, John Adams, II, 8̂ 8,
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28Federalist proposals.
At this point Adams read Edmund Randolph's (Jefferson’s sud-» 
cesser in the State Department) comprehensive report accounting for 
spoliations against American shipping by. the European belligerents and 
the Algerines, Randolph revealed that the number of depredations
29attributed to the British far exceeded those ascribed to the French, 
Adams sensed a decidedly alarming increase in the war fever after 
Randolph’s report was published^ but the Vice-President was "deter­
mined to do all that may depend on me to keep war off as long as 
possible,
Ten days after Randolph sent his message to Congress, the
Federalists’ defense policy reached fruition as Republicans joined
them in authorizing the naval bill, a harbor fortification act and
approving a large arny appropriation. Their willingness to support
Federalist defense measures reflected the muse of bi-partisanship that
would be revived again in the Republic’s history, Adams considered
the legislation necessary, though he lamented the unenviable cost—
81an eternal debt, and the probable result— a disastrous war. He 
pointed out to his wife that "all the men and most of the raonpy" would 
come from the New England States if war ensued, lamenting the said 
fact that even if the Americans were victorious, "others will throw
Z&Ibid., b63-h6$, k70-L7k.
^̂ Ibid., k23-khh.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 13, 179h, Adams Papers, 
^^Ibid.
h.9
off the harden of British debts and obtain the advantages of [the]| fur
and peltry trade and western lands, jwhile New England has^ not the
smallest thing to hope for."^^
Adams agreed that "Britain has done much amiss and deserves all
33that will fall thereon," but the war fever which was scourging the 
nation was due principally to the Republicans whose ranks were heavily 
peppered with debt-burdened Southerners anxious to avoid paying their 
English creditors, land hungry speculators poised to grab western 
territory under Indian control,and fur traders greedily waiting for 
the British to lose the vast fur-bearing wilderness, Adams was also 
skeptical of the Federalists’ appeals for public support of the defense 
measures, "They are seeking popularity and loaves and fishes as well 
as the Antis , , . Adams remarked wryly. He was shocked by the 
Federalist sponsored festivals commemorating a British naval victory 
in the Indies when the Hamiltonian faction was vigorously supporting 
defense measures designed to protect America from an English attack. 
Moreover, Adams could "see no cause of joy" in the victories of either 
belligerent when American shipping was being swept from the seas,^
The furor created by the crisis that prompted the passage of 
defense measures in Congress also produced a fertile seedbed and favor­
able climate for the resurgence of the Democratic-Republican societies
32john Adams to Abigail Adams, March l5, Vf9hs Adams Papers.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, April IB, 179b, Adams Papers,
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 11, 179b, Adams Papers,
3^John Adams to Abigail Adams, Februaiy 9, 179b, Adams Papers,
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spawned ty Genet. And the elnbs were particnlarly strong in the sea­
ports which were populated with citizens dependent on foreign commerce. 
The societies were clamoring for hostilities, and Adams recognized 
their harm to the cause of peace, remarking that combinations of 
political parties and protest societies left little hope for peace.
Adams was disturbed further by the continued attempts on the 
part of both factions in Congress to enact coercive legislation against 
British shipping and debts. On March lit, Congressman W.lliam Giles of 
Virginia, a Republican, attempted to revive Madison's commercial 
propositions. Shortly afterwards, Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, 
a Hamiltonian Federalist, proposed an embargo on all shipping, Sedg­
wick also requested, following Hamilton's suggestion, that a wartime
37aruy of fifteen thousand men be established. To keep the political 
initiative, the Federalists defeated Giles' motions in the House and 
passed Sedgwick's embargo on March 25. On the following day the em­
bargo passed the Senate.
Adams did not believe the embargo would serve any good purpose. 
To him, it was only one more step toward war.-̂  The Vice-President 
was surprised, then, when the embargo dampened the strength and vital­
ity of the Democratic-Republican societies, "The people here [in 
Philadelphia) are much cooler than they were [before the embargo be­
came effective). [ltj[ begins to be felt by many who have been the
3%ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, March 17, 179b, Adams Papers,
' '̂̂ Annals, III, 500-50b, 535-bl, 561. For Hamilton's role see 
Carroll and Ashworth, George Washington, p. l6l,
^%ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, April 3, 179b, Adams Papers,
OQmost noisy and turbulent/' Adams was partienlarly gratified to 
learn that the legislation was cooling the passions of the Boston­
ians.^^ Bat he was alarmed by the continued opposition of the Repub­
licans to neutrality. He was anguished particularly by a motion of 
Johnathan Dayton of New Jersey to sequester private debts due British 
merchants. Adams condemned it as dishonorable and predicted that it 
would never pass the Senate.
Adams remained consistently opposed to the actions of all fac­
tions and clubs to Incite war. He was not afraid of an "honest war,"
but he saw no justification for a war prompted by the clamorings of 
the Democratic-Republican societies. In such a conflict, Adams re­
marked, "we know not who would be our enemies, nor who would be our
1.0friends, nor what we would get nor what we might lose."^ It was 
Adams’ greatest fear that if the American republic became involved in 
war at that moment, it might imitate the horrors of the French Revo­
lution. And saddened by the impending possibility of conflict Adams 
consoled himself in reflecting that "I have one comfort that in thought,
howord or deed, I have never encouraged a war.
Adams pessimism was relieved somewhat on April h when Pinckney
reported from London that the November, 1793, Order-in-Council was
39lbld.
^°Ibid.
^^John Adams to John Quincy Adams, April 23, 179b, Adams Papers.
jip^ John Adams to John Quincy Adams, April 7, 179b, Adams Papers.
^3john Adams to Abigail Adams, March 27, 179b, Adams Papers.
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revoked by the British government, replaced by a far less drastic 
measure. And while Adams believed the nation was still in great dan­
ger he was certain the worst was over. ”A few of us have been steady 
to peace and tranquility and we still hope to avoid a fall,”̂ ^ Mio 
Adams numbered among those dedicated to peace is difficult to ascer­
tain. Neither the Federalists nor the Republicans in Congress were 
consistently pacifistic. But in Adams’ estimation those most respons­
ible for the war fever were "the old debtors to England funitedj with 
those who ŵere] bribed to F r a n c e . H e  clearly indicated that the 
debt burdened Southerners and the "Frenchified zealots" in the Demo­
cratic-Republican societies were those who were willing to "donate 
this country to calamities as unnecessary as th^ ^ould[ be dismal.
The British action in withdrawing the November Order-in-Council 
precipitated a small group of Federalists to encourage President Wash­
ington to send an envoy, vested with extraordinary powers, to London 
to negotiate a general settlement with the English, The proposal 
was not new. In early March, Secretary Randolph suggested the same 
thing, but Washington was not receptive at the time.^^
There is no evidence to indicate that the Vice-President was 
approached ty the Federalist peace emissaries. But the Vice-President,
^^John Adams to John Quincy Adams, April 5, 179b, Adams Papers. 
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 5, 179b, Adams Papers. 
^̂ Ibid.
^^Carroll and Ashworth, George Washington, p. l60j C. R. King, 
Life and Correspondence of .Rufus'Ting,''S'vols'.' (New York, I89b-1900),
as King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King.
^ 3
along with Jefferson and John Jajs were candidates Washington proposed 
for the embassy, though he was reluctant to supercede the resident 
minister, Thomas Pinckney» The Federalists sponsoring the mission, 
(principally, George Cabot, Oliver Ellsworth, Rufus King and Robert 
Morris) presented Hamilton as their candidate» Adams’ nomination did 
not appeal to the cabal, Morris stated that Adams "was not suited
] O
tempermentally" for the task. In other words, the Federalists did 
not trust the Vice-President whose previous mission to London was 
singularly fruitless. Jefferson was not seriously considered, since 
the Federalists believed him to be passionately anti-British and a 
partisan of the French. Hamilton’s selection was vetoed by Washington 
because the President did not feel his Treasury Secretary enjoyed 
public confidence. Moreover, Hamilton at the veiy moment was under 
attack by a House committee for re-allocating funds without authoriza­
tion.
This left Jay, the Chief Justice, and the scion of a prominent 
New York family whose popularity with the Federalists was boundless, 
but whose reputation among the Republicans was limited. Jay, like 
Adams, failed to wring concessions from the British when he was the 
Confederation’s Foreign Secretary, and he was willing to yield Spain 
free navigation of the Mississippi River during the Jay-Gardoqui nego­
tiation of 1787-88. Moreover, Jay was distrusted by the Southerners 
because as Chief Justice he rendered the majority opinion in 1793 
which invalidated a Virginia law sequestrating British debts. In
liBcarroll and Ashworth, George Washington, p. I6W.
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many respects Jay was the quintessence of Federalism; a staunch con­
servative who believed that "those who own the country ought to govern 
it." The Chief Justice, to be sure, was public-spirited, devoted to 
the Union and a paragon of virtue. But he was an anathema to the 
Democratic-Republican societies because he helped to bring the down­
fall of Qen&.^^
Adams liked Jay, and he considered the Chief Justice one of his 
better friends. The two of them exchanged a spirited and intimate 
correspondence when Adams was in London. And Adams was genuinely 
pleased when the Senate confirmed Jay's nomination as special envoy 
on April lit, 179it.̂  ̂ In confirming Jay to the post the Federalists 
were not divided. All eighteen of them cast their votes for the envoy 
and his mission.
But the nomination was neither tendered to Jay nor approved by 
the Senate without a great clamor of protest from within the ranks of 
the Republicans and the societies. For practical purposes, the Repub­
licans could not oppose the peace mission, but they did attempt to 
prevent the confirmation of Jay, and failing in this, strove to handi­
cap the envoy's embassy by supporting a non-intercourse bill aimed at 
suppressing all trade with England,
^^See generally Frank Monahan, John Jay, Defender of Liberty, 
pp. 2UUffj hereafter cited as Monahan, John Jay. For Jay’s role in 
the Jay-Oar'doqui negotiations see Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, pp. 203-208. 
The Chief Justice's position on British debts is presented in Charles 
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 2 vols. (Boston,
ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, April 19, 179ii, Adams Papers.
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Adams was angered by the non-intercourse proposal. It would 
have stopped trade altogether and it would have probably hampered 
the Jay mission, Adams believed the Anglo-American crisis far too 
grave in 179b for the Americans to demonstrate bad faith by restric­
ting English commerce while simultaneously seeking accommodation with 
the British government. The non-intercourse resbîutïon was, how­
ever, supported by both Republicans and Federalists, A good many 
Federalist Congressmen believed that the bill would give Jay a diplo­
matic weapon by which the envoy could wring concessions from the 
British, The turning point on the question came in the Senate when 
its members were evenly divided. Not since Adams was minister to 
London was his role in the American government more important than 
when he was required to cast the tie-breaking vote. In the Senate 
the "tie-wig" Hamiltonian faction denounced the non-intercourse bill 
as a threat to peace while the moderate Federalists and Republicans 
favored the proposal for reasons ranging from a desire of arming Jay 
with bargaining power to a hope of seeing the mission fail altogether,
Adams decided in favor of the "tie-wig" faction and thereby 
defeated the controversial proposal. In taking such a stand Adams 
was prompted unquestionably by the desire to keep the peace and cer­
tainly he was aware that Jay refused to embark for London if the 
non-intercourse bill passed Congress, While Adams' move played into 
the hands of the Federalists, the Vice-President was acting only to
^John Adams to John Quincy Adams, April 23, 179b, Adams Papers,
52Annal8. HI, 89-90.
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sustain Washington’s policy. The non-intercourse issue did, however, 
pinpoint the Federalists’ need for Adams.
But to Adams the most significant aspect of Jay’s nomination 
and appointment was its possible effect on the Presidential succession. 
"If Jay should succeed [in negotiating a popular treaty}," Adams re­
marked, "it will recommend him to the choice of the people for Presi­
dent as soon as a vacancy should happen." This, Adams believed, would 
"weaken the hopes of the Southern States for J e f f e r s o n . A n d  it 
would weaken the hopes of the Vice-President as well.
Adams felt that he should be Washington’s successor. He dis­
liked the need for statesmen to cater to public desires and passions. 
Moreover, he heartily disapproved of the willingness of politicians 
to focus their ambitions on popularity. The Vice-President perceived 
that if Jay was successful, a pleased public would elect the envoy to 
the presidency. On the other hand, if Jay failed the Federalists 
would be repudiated and the first office might fall to Jefferson.
Adams, in either case, would not benefit. But Adams was probably 
prematurely pessimistic. Jay viewed the mission in sharp contrast to 
Adams’ assessments "No man could form a treaty with Great Britain, 
however advantageous it might be to the country, who would not by his 
agency render himself so unpopular and odious as to blast all hope of 
political preferment." As Adams lamented the fact that the mission
^3john Adams to Abigail Adams, April 19, 179h, Adams Papers. 
5^Quoted in George Pellew, John Jay (New York, I898), p. 265.
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might destroy his political career, his devoted wife assured him that 
he was protecting the welfare of the nation. In return for his ser­
vices, she wrote, the "people will one day do justice to your memory.
Adams was alarmed by the renewed fervor of the Democratic- 
Republican clubs after Jay's appointment. The societies publicly 
condemned the envoy, as the Vice-President described it, for his "monar- 
chial principles, his indifference to the navigation of the Mississippi, 
his attachment to England (andj his aversion to F r a n c e . A d d e d  to 
this was the continued efforts on the part of Republicans in the House 
to enact debt sequestration bills. It was certainly clear to Adams 
that the Southern States were determined to avoid paying their British 
debts. This was, in the Vice-President’s estimation, the "real object 
of all the wild projects and made motions which have been made during 
the whole session."^?
The anti-Administration demonstrations which followed the en­
voy’s appointment were prompted also by the fact that the Senate was 
not playing ary official role in determining Jay’s instructions.
Adams unquestionably was pleased and relieved when a Republican spon­
sored a motion requiring the instructions be revealed to the Senate 
was defeated. He believed that the President’s prerogative in foreign 
affairs should be absolute and he realized that the mission would 
never take place if a detailed plan for Jay's diplomacy was formulated
^^Abigail Adams to John Adams, Quincy, May 10, 179li, Adams Papers.
%  ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, April 19, 179b, Adams Papers.
^7John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 10, 179b, Adams Papers.
58
with the "advice and consent" of the Senate. But Adams was probably 
annoyed when he was not consulted by those drafting the instructions. 
Signifieantly^ the task of preparing the instructions was shared 
principally by Hamilton and the "tie-wig" Federalists in the Senate 
— the faction most interested in an Anglo-American rapprochement.
In many respects, the envoy was going to tread over the same 
diplomatic coals which confronted Adams' mission in London after the 
Revolution. Jay was to press for a surrender of the western posts and 
indemnification for Negro slaves carried off during and after the Revo­
lution. He was to demand compensation for spoliation claims against 
the British and insist upon a definition of contraband which did not 
include foodstuffs, grains or naval stores. In exchange, Jay was em­
powered to promise that the United States would settle unpaid debt 
claims up to a certain amount. Hamilton suggested that Jay be given 
powers to conclude a commercial treaty, provided that it allowed some 
American trade into the West Indies. Moreover, the envoy was to se­
cure British endorsement of the American maritime principles of (l) 
free ships to make free goods and (2) free commerce to all but effec­
tively blockaded ports. Only two Immutable stipulations were outlined 
in Jay's instructions: the envoy was not to agree to ary accord that 
could contravene existing treaties between the United States and 
France, and he was not to consent to any commercial agreement that 
did not permit American ships to trade in the British West Indies.
%ay's instructions are printed in full in Lowrie and Clark, 
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, L72-b7h. Hamilton's 
memorandum is in 3, G. Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 9 vols. 
(New York, 1885-1886), 17, 300-301;, hereafter cited as Lodge, Hamilton's 
Works.
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%ith the exception of the two provisions which Jay was not to trav­
erse, his instructions permitted the envoy the greatest latitude in 
negotiating with the English in the spirit of friendship. Ample pro­
visions were specified to allow Jay to settle all disputes. But armed 
with great bargaining authority restrained by only two relatively un­
important conditions there was no reason to anticipate that the envoy 
would be able to secure concessions from the English. Jay lacked a 
weapon to encourage the British to accommodate the United States. To 
lend weight to the envoy’s diplomacy, then, Jay was permitted to 
threaten American participation in an Armed Neutrality.
Adams advocated American membership in a new Armed Neutrality 
of the North as a weapon to force an equitable settlement at the con­
ference t a b l e . T h e  Vice-President was anxious for an enduring 
Anglo-American peace, but he was unwilling to see the United States 
chained to the British orbit in exchange for economic concessions.
The Americans benefited from Armed Neutrality of 1?80 and Adams could 
expect that a renewal of that league of small-navy nations would re­
dress some American complaints against British maritime practices.
Despite Adams' viewpoint and Jay’s instructions, Hamilton counseled 
the envoy against participation in a Baltic alliance. The Treasuiy 
Secretary did not believe that threats would aid Jay in negotiations.^^
The departure of the envoy for England, in May, 179U, with the 
best wishes of Adams and others, was a turning point in the Anglo-
ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, April 23, 179b, Adams Papers.
^°Lodge, Hamilton’s Works, IV, 308-315, 319-320.
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American imbroglio. Evezy effort was being made on the part of the 
United States to resolve the crisis between the two nations. This 
effortj which culminated after ten years of fruitless negotiations, 
reflected decisively the need for the United States to live peaceably 
with the British. But at the same time it revealed the unmistakably 
growing intransigence between the Administration and its critics out­
side of Congress. As Adams lamented: "we go on as usual— Congress 
resolving one thing and the Democratic societies resolving the con­
trary. All factions in Congress were committed to Jay’s negotia­
tions in London, though the Republicans questioned the necessity of 
the mission. On the other hand, the clubs were threatening the veiy 
existence of the government. To this extent Adams condemned them as
criminal. By fomenting prejudice and passion the societies were the
62greatest threat to a peaceful settlement.
As for the mission itself, Adams had "no great faith in ary 
very brillant fsij su c c e ss , b u t  he was confident that "Mr. Jay 
[was] to immortalize himself over again by keeping peace,
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 10, 179b, Adams Papers.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 179b, Adams Papers,
^^John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, in Cappon, Adams-Jefferson 
Letters, I, 255.
'̂ Ĵohn Adams to Abigail Adams, May 5, 179b, Adams Papers.
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THE POLITICS OF RAPPROCHEMENT
The Federalist success in promoting the peace mission of John 
Jay was a major victory for it stopped at least temporarily any Repub­
lican attempts to legislate economic coercion against the British.
But the unpopularity of the embassy among the Republicans did not 
diminish. Moreover, the whole question of a possible Anglo-American 
rapprochement became a burning public issue. The Democratic-Republi­
can societies in particular besieged the public forums with continuous 
assaults on Jay, Washington, and the mission throughout the summer of 
179U.
From the time the envcy departed for London until his treaty 
was voted into effect nearly two ÿears later, John Adams played a 
quiescent role. Remaining on the side lines the Vice-President, none­
theless, viewed the spasms of the young republic with intensity and 
interest.
Adams’ attention, while in Braintree for the summer of 179h, 
was focused upon the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Since 
the revolt could not be subdued by local authorities, the Administra­
tion was compelled to deal with it at the very moment when the issue 
of peace or war with England hung in the balance. Moreover, it alsp 
produced an unprecedented public condemnation of the clubs by the 
President at the same time that the societies were passionately
62
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1villifying the Jay mission.
Adams roundly supported,Washington's censure of the societies' 
activities, contending that they cpuld not be permitted to shake the 
foundations of the government. He insisted, though, "that political 
clubs must and ought to be lawful in every free country,but if the 
activities of the Democratic-Republican societies continued serious 
damage would result. The people must "either dismiss their Congress
•5or restrain their clubs," he remarked. The Vice-President was highly 
suspicious of the societies' intentions. Indeed, he was convinced 
that the clubs were attempting either to dictate public policy by the 
use of street demonstrations or— worse— overthrow the Administration. 
Adams noted that even under an enlightened government, it was not 
lawful "to meet and publish censures upon laws and libels upon men 
and measures."^
Adams and the Federalists warmly endorsed the Presidential de­
nunciation of the clubs, but Washington's censure of them was attacked 
by the Republicans in the House. It appeared to the Madisonian faction 
that the President was married to the Federalists, and Madison himself 
believed that the censure of the societies was "perhaps the greatest
ISee generally Deland D. Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, The Story of 
a Frontier Uprising (Pittsburg, 1939}; pertinent documents are in 
Lowrie and Clark, American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I, 83-113; 
Carroll and Ashworth, 5eorge Washington, p. 219.
^John Adams to Abigail Adams, December lli, VJ9h, Adams Papers.
3john Adams to Abigail Adams, December 23, 179k, Adams Papers.
^John Adams to Abigail Adams, November 26, 179k, Acams Papers.
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error of [Washington’s] political life." From the standpoint of the 
Republicans the President’s action abruptly ended his olympian aloof­
ness from party polities.
The clubs were attacking the Administration and villlfying Jay's 
mission incessantly. And when it was learned in January, 1795, of un­
official reports that Jay signed a treaty during the previous November, 
the societies were enraged. Since thé emissary’s very presence in 
England was anathema to the clubs, the reports of Jay’s success brought 
perdition upon his name. The envoy was subjected to a nasiy ink pot 
assassination by his opponents and Adams professed that his friend 
still had ’’a fiery ordeal to go through.’’̂
The Vice-President viewed the villification crusade with in­
creasing alarm. Every scrap of news from England concerning the envcy’s 
conduct at the British court was made the object of sarcasm and criti­
cism. Jay’s social life was pictured as villainous by the societies 
and the pro-French newspapers.^ On one occasion the clubs in Phila­
delphia provided a vivid demonstration of what the reception of any 
treaty with England would be. Around the neck of an effigy of Jay
^Johh"Adams to Abigail Adams, February 10, 1795, Adams Papers.
^Jay’s antagonists alluded to the formal kiss given King George’s 
consort as being a surrender of the nation’s sovereignty; but his enemies 
suggested, instead, that the Chief Justice pressed a kiss on His Majesty’s 
ass, Monahan, John Jay, p. 338. Considerable abuse was heaped on Jay 
because he was staying in England long after the negotiations were con­
cluded. The envoy was suffering from rheumatism. The Philadelphia 
Aurora, a Republican bellweather, disdained Jay’s illness: "No wonder 
he fjayj should be short breathed and have palpitations as to need the 
Bath [England]' waters to restore him after subscribing to so dishonor­
able a treaty as that [it is] said to have been concluded." Quoted in 
Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochements England and America, 1795- 
1805 (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 30, hereafter cited as Perkins, The First 
Rapprochement.
6^
stuffed -with gunpowder was hung one volupie of the Vice-President’s 
Defense. After suitable rites the effigy was exploded while the on-
7lookers gave a spirited rendition of the ’’Marsellaise." The associ­
ation of Adams with the peace mission was based on the Vice-President’s 
support of Washington’s policies in Congress, his alleged attachment 
to monarchy and aristocracy and possibly a mistaken belief that Adams 
was intimately associated with peace embassy.
The Federalists in Congress were profoundly disturbed hy the 
repeated anti-treaty demonstrations. Earlier protests of the Admin­
istration’s neutrality policy paled before the sustained attack that 
the treaty and its co-author suffered during the winter of 179)4.-179?. 
Adams m y  well have reflected a consensus of the Federalist reaction 
to the demonstrations when he remarked in February of 179? that he was
Q
’’very much afraid of this treaty.”
Adams’ fear for the treaty was prompted by the activities of 
the clubs. If an impassioned atmosphere hostile to the Anglo-American 
agreement prevailed when it was received in the United States it was 
conceivable that the accord might be defeated. If this was the case, 
the Federal government would appear no stronger to England than its 
predecessor. Moreover, the clubs might well replace Congress! The 
situation was not improved by the unfortunate delays which prevented 
the treaty from arriving in America until long after it was expected.
While Adams and the Senate were waiting for the fateful accord.
^Monahan, John Jay, pp. 388-389.
O
John Adams to Abigail Adams, Februaiy 10, 179?, Adams Papers.
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the Vice-President was asked by his wife to return home. Adams, how­
ever, was certain that Jay's dispatches would arrive before the Senate 
adjourned. In reply, he pleaded that if he left the capitol he "should 
be charged with deserting the President, forsaking the Secretary of 
State, betraying ray friend Jay and abandoning By post."^ Adams could 
not leave the Senate when a treaty of great importance was expected 
daily. KLs presence was needed to defend the Administration's poli­
cies. Adams was convinced that the very foundations of the government 
as well as the prestige of the Administration depended upon all the 
assistance that could be mustered to sustain Jay's negotiations. It 
was no longer a question whether or not the government would accept 
the treaty, because the issue to be decided was whether or not the 
government could survive the treaty's negotiations. Adams was certain, 
though, that the treaty would be approved, thereby saving the govern­
ment from ruin. But "a battle royal I expect at its ratification and
10smarting enough afterwards," he concluded.
The treaty did not arrive before the fourth of March, and the 
Senate adjourned sine die after Washington requested its successor to 
meet in a special session on June 8. The new Senate would be dominated 
by more Federalists than its predecessor. Federalist electoral vic­
tories in the fall of 179b, won on the strength of the Whiskey Rebel­
lion, gave the Federalist party twenty seats in the upper chamber.
Adams confidently asserted that "the Senate for the next two years
%ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, February 2, 1795, Adams Papers.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, Februaiy 9, 1795, Adams Papers.
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will be the most decidedly for peace and order of any which has served
nunder the Constitution." Certainly Adams' confidence in the treaty's 
eventual acceptance was based on Federalist voting strength in the 
Senate.
Three days after Adams left Philadelphia the treaty was deliv­
ered in the capital. In a tense letter of transmittal the envoy stated 
he had "no reason to believe or conjecture that one more favorable to 
us is attainable.But Jay conceded to Rufus King that "if I entirely 
escape censure I shall be agreeably disappointed."^^ Jay knew that it 
was impossible to satisfy the demands of factions which opposed the 
mission in the first place.
After Adams' frustrated attempts to bridge the Anglo-American 
imbroglio. Jay's diplomacy represented the better efforts of an Ameri­
can to resolve ancient disputes, to adjudicate countervailing claims 
and to keep the peace. In contrast to Adams' mission, however. Jay 
negotiated with Englishmen deeply involved in war. In fact, during 
the negotiations the British were confronted with vacillating allies
lUand calamitous defeats, a serious grain shortage and a mutinous Havy.
The British did not desire war with the United States. Indeed, as one
Hjohn Adams to Abigail Adams, February 11, 1795, Adams Papers.
12john J ^  to George Washington, London, November 19, 179U, 
in Lowrie and Clark, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 503.
^^Quoted in C. R. King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,
6 vols. (New York, l89li-1900), 17382.
^Ward and Gooch, History of British Foreign Policy, I, 252-,.251.
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British consul pointed out the Americans were "so much in debt to 
jknglandj that we scarcely dare quarrel with thera."^^ In such an 
atmosphere Adams surely could have wrung concessions from the British.
Under Jay’s Treaty the British were required to withdraw from
16the disputed posts by June 1, 1796. In exchange for this concession 
the United States agreed to bi-national arbitration of all bona fide 
British debt claims which further provided that the federal government 
pay all certified claims. An additional arbitration commission was 
established hy the treaty to adjudicate depredations claims arising 
from attacks by the British on American ships and spoliations by Amer­
ican privateers’ (holding French letters-of-marque) vessels. Both 
nations wère forbidden to sequester public or private debts or con­
tracts due in either nation on account of national differences.
In satisfying one of the immutable conditions in his instruc­
tions, Jay secured limited American trade in the West Indies. United 
States vessels were permitted to take American produce and manufac­
tures in ships weighing less than seventy tons into the Indies and 
carry awsy in the same ships tropical produce. This commerce was 
granted to the Americans provided that the United States agreed not 
to export in American ships molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa or cotton 
from its shores or from the Indies to ary port in the world. In
^%ayo. Instructions to British Ministers, p. 60N.
^%'here are innumerable works which contain the full treaty 
text. See iftinter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts 
of the United States, 178]-18^^ (Washington, 1931-19h2), 6 vols., II, 
2E^-267j in Bemis, Jay’s Treaty, pp. 252-271, there is a complete 
delineation of the treaty’s articles together with the projets.
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short, the United States could not revive the colonial trade pattern 
from which the Americans benefited most before 177^. In spite of 
these limitations, Americans were granted open trade in the East 
Indies and therjr were permitted to carry American produce and manu­
factures in United States vessels to certain imperial ports. In ex­
change for these concessions the British were given a ten-year guar­
antee against discriminatory duties and tonnage restrictions and the 
right to levy countervailing duties on American ships and goods.
Contraband was divided into two classes. Absolute contraband 
was to be confiscated when found, but conditional contraband (provi­
sions, foodstuffs) was to be indemnified when seized. Indemnification 
was to comprise "the full value of all such articles, with reasonable 
mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight and demurrage."
Another arbitration commission was created to settle boundary 
disputes between the United States and Canada. Privateers, other than 
Englishmen or Americans, were forbidden to sell their prizes and re­
fill their ships in the ports of either nation. To satisfy the other 
"immutable condition" Jay and his diplomatic adversary agreed that 
nothing in the treaty would conflict with ary public accords between 
either of the two controlling powers and third parties.
Unfortunately, Jay was unable to secure a British endorsement 
of American maritime principles. As a result the envcy accepted de 
facto the Rule of 17^6 which provided that trade closed in peace 
could not be opened in war and other naval devices employed by Great
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17Britain to suppress neutral trade with her enemies. Moreover, Jay 
was not able to collect compensation for the slaves and other property 
carried away by the British in I783. Despite his instructions, Jay 
did not negotiate with atiy of the Baltic powers in an attempt to re­
vive the Armed Neutrality. Actually, the possibility of a renewal of 
the league of small navy powers was minimal, since Russia was pledged
by a treaty (1793) with England to suppress ary revival of the alli- 
1 Aance.
For two months the provisions of Jay's treaty were kept secret
from the public, and while Adams was awaiting to return to the capital
the Democratic-Republican societies continued their attacks on Washing­
ton, Jay and the treaty. Scurrilous extracts from the accord were
published to muster support for a citizens assault on the agreement. 
Senators were instructed ly committees and cabals to defeat the treaty. 
As Adams predicted, a storm awaited the Anglo-Amerkoan in the Senate 
and in the streets.
Adams was not privy to the contents of Jay's Treaty until the 
Senate convened on June 8, 1795. On the whole, the Vice-President 
considered the treaty compatible with American interest, though he 
unquestionably thought he could have secured more for his countrymen. 
The surrender of the posts, which Adams believed necessary for any 
settlement, would enhance the dignity of the young republic while it
^%iller. Federalist Era, p. I66.
^®¥ard and Gooch, History of British Foreign Policy, I, 238. 
^^Perkins, The First Rapprochement, pp. 32-35.
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Onlessened tension in the Northwest. Payment of the pre-war debts of
Americans due British creditors was an acceptable concession, in 
PIAdams’ opinion. Since he earlier pressed for indemnification of 
English spoliations on American shipping, the Vice-President was un­
doubtedly satisfied with the treaty’s provisions establishing arbi­
tration commissions to pay c l a i m s . A n d  Adams fully agreed that it 
was impolitic and improper to sequester any debt. Though Jay’s Treaty 
with Great Britain contained none of the maritime principles which 
were incorporated by the United States into treaties with small-navy 
powers, Adams realized that the United States was powerless to enforce 
its neutrality precepts without a navy.^^ The Vice-President was dis­
pleased with the West Indies trade provisions in Article Twelve. "To 
restrain ourselves from exporting whatever we please is humiliating 
and a mean surrender of a part of our independence," he remarked. 
Indeed, the Americans fought a revolution, in part, to free their 
trade from the strictures of English economic policy.
When the Senate commenced debate on the trea^ the party spirit 
which prevailed in the previous session was markedly evident. The 
Federalists voted to keep the proceedings and the treaty secret from
^%ohn Adams to Abigail Adams, Februaiy 11, 179^, Adams Papers. 
2XDauer, Adams Federalists, p. 62.
2PJohn Adams to Abigail Adams, April 3, 179b, Adams Papers.
23john Adams to Thomas Jefferson, London, July 31, 1786, in 
Cappon, Adams-Jefferson Letters, I, lU6-lb7.
^^John Adams to John Quincy Adams, New York, June 29, 179$,
Adams Papers.
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the public over violent Republican objections. The Republicans hoped 
to muster pressure from outside of the Senate in order to defeat the 
accord.
Adams used his position to assist twenty Federalists in main­
taining complete solidarity and nearly absolute control over all phases 
of the debate. Since there -was a prevailing dislike in both factions 
for the West Indies trade provisions in Article Twelve, the Federalists 
proposed and voted a partial suspension of that Article. The best 
efforts of the Republicans to defeat the treaty ty crippling amend­
ments, dilatory debate and remonstrances were unsuccessful.
The envcy was denounced for yielding the concession of a ten- 
year American moratorium on levying discriminatory duties, and Jay was 
condemned for failing to gain recognition for American maritime princi­
ples.
The Republicans nearly broke Federalist solidarity by centering 
their final attack on Jay^s failure to secure compensation for the 
slaves. All of the Federalist Senators south of the Mason-Dixon line 
voted for a motion to have negotiations renewed over this point, but 
a close vote gave victory to the Federalist phalanx from the northern 
states.
Adams was obviously pleased with the Federalists' ability to 
keep the offensive in the debates. He observed that the proceedings 
were "temperate, grave, decent and wise." On the other hand, the 
Republicans were enraged Ty their opponent's ability to rout,;! all
AdaJns Phpers.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, Philadelphia, June lli, 1795,
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opposition to the treaty. In fact. Federalist predominance led Henry
Tazewell, a Republican from Virginia, to declare that the entire debate
26"was the most uncandid and unfair proceeding I have ever witnessed."
The Federalists domination of the debate yielded victory. On 
June 2I4, 179^, by a vote of 20 to 10, the Senate approved the treaty 
without the West Indies trade article. And after the session adjourned 
Adams returned to his home in Braintree, observing from a distance the 
"battles royal" which were waged over the accord throughout the nation 
during the summer and fall of 1793. In spite of the animosity of the 
crowds and the unpopularity of the treaty, the Vice-President was con­
vinced that "the treaty will become the law and be carried into execu­
tion. "^7
When news reached Adams in Quincy in early July that the British 
were confiscating American grain ships bound for French ports, the 
Vice-President almost despaired. It was a sad revelation of American 
weakness and a blunt reminder of British power. Enraged by the appar­
ent betrayal of the English Adams cried: "I wish that misfortune and
adversity could soften the temper and humiliate the insolence of John 
Bull." And lamenting the fact that Americans were powerless to re­
taliate, Adams forewarned that at some distant time in the future "it 
is to be the destiny of America to beat down [john Bull's] pride,
Z^Quoted in Carroll and Ashworth, George Washington, p. 23lM.
^7john Adams to John Quincy Adams, Braintree, August 23, 1793, 
Adams Papers.
28john Adams to Abigail Adams, Philadelphia, June 19, 1793,
Adams Papers.
Ik
The British spoliations fed fuel to the anti-treaty forces 
and prompted more anglophobes to demonstrate against Jay and the ill- 
fated agreement. In New York, Hamilton was stoned a mob when he 
attempted to speak on behalf of the t r e a t y . A n d  in Philadelphia 
prominent Republicans, including Frederick Mahleriberg, the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, impaled the treaty on a stick and 
marched through the city. Windows in the British minister's resi-
30dence were broken and Federalists' homes were despoiled with {baint.
Adams was unaware that the furor of the anti-treaty forces 
and the renewed British depredations disturbed the President so much 
that he refused to ratify the agreement until the English withdrew 
the most recent Order-in-Council. But when he later learned of 
Washington's hesitation, Adams remarked that the President should 
have signed the treaty promptly. Such an acfc, Adams believed, might 
have quelled much of the opposition to the Administration at a time 
when the government needed to convey its strength.
The treaty was ratified in August after Edmund Randolph, the 
Secretary of State, was implicated in a plot to serve the interests 
of F r a n c e . T h e  revelation of Randolph's alleged conspiracy convinced
^%iller. Federalist Era, p. l68.
^%onahan, John Jay, pp. 388-389.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, January 7, 1796, Adams Papers.
^^The story of Randolph's alleged perfidy is related in many 
secondary sources. See Irving Brant, "Edmund Randolph, Not Guilty!"' 
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, VII (19^0), l80-l89j W. W.
Ford, ed., "Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty," American Histor­
ical Review, XII (1907), 587-599j Josiah T. Newcomb, "New Lights on 
Jay's Treaty," American Journal of International Law, XXVIII (I93h), 687.
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the President that the government might he further endangered unless 
the accord was signed. After Washington signed the treaty the Repub­
licans and the Democratic-Republican societies concentrated on gather­
ing support to defeat the agreement in the House of Representatives. 
Their chances appeared bright, since a majority of the House and the 
Speakership were Republican.
Despite the obvious difficulty Jay's Treaty would find in the 
lower chamber, Adams was confident it would be carried into effect.
He was grateful to learn on returning to the capitol in December,
1795, that many Congressmen were anxious to vote appropriations to 
carry the Anglo-American accord into effect. And he remarked that 
"a great majority will support the government and the treaty." Adams 
believed both would be sustained in the H o u s e . T h e  Vice-President 
was encouraged further by a series of ne'^paper articles supporting 
the treaty published by Hamilton in lew York.^^ It appeared to Adams 
that the treaty crisis was going to pass into history.
A hostile House started war on the treaty the day after it was 
proclaimed by Washington in February, 1796. Adams was alarmed by 
ferocity of the Republicans and the prospect of the popular chamber 
refusing to accede to the accord: "If the House of Representatives
condemn this treaty and defeat its operation I see nothing but disso­
lution of government and immediate war. President, Senate and House 
all dissolve and old Côngress revives, debts are all cancelled, paper
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, December 12, 1795, Adams Papers.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, January 31, 1796, Adams Papers.
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money issued and forced into circulation by the bayonets, and in short
•31^heaven and earth set at d e f i a n c e , B u t  the Vice-President could not 
believe "that th^ jjbhe Republicans^ will be so desperate and unreason­
able."^^
The anti-treaty forces in the House, led by James Madison, 
fashioned their attack on Jay’s accord by condemning it as the parti­
san act of a party willing to surrender the nation’s sovereignty. And 
the nation at large mirrored the Republican hostility. The countryside 
burned with meetings, and newspapers flamed with editorials. There 
was disunion in the air and Adams was exasperated. "I sometimes think," 
he wrote, "that I sm laboring in vain and spending ny life for nought
in a fruitless endeavor to pursue a union that, being detested on both
37sides, cannot long last."
But the excesses of the Republicans and the ever present Demo­
cratic-Republican societies began to backfire. The uncertainty of 
the treaty’s fate led to general trade stagnation in Boston, Philadel­
phia and New York. Insurance underwriters refused to insure cargoes, 
and merchants dismissed their employees. This, in turn, led an aroused 
citizenry in New England to demand that the treaty be voted into exe­
cution. To counterbalance the more prejudicial character of the 
treaty’s opposition, dispassionate groups of merchants and others 
signed petitions and issued protests calling upon the House of
3^John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 11, 1796, Adams Papers.
^̂ Ibid.
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, March 7, 1796, Adams Papers.
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Representatives to vote the appropriations and keep the nation free 
from internecine strife.Nonetheless, opposition persisted in the 
South.
Adams was angered by the continued intransigence of the Southern 
States. The Vice-President condemned as "sordid” a South Carolinian 
legislative resolution that denounced Jay for failing to secure com­
pensation for the s l a v e s . T o  the Vice-President this act demonstrated 
the unwillingness of the Southerners to support the government. During 
the crisis of 179b the Southerners were willing to risk war to avoid 
paying their debts. In 1796 the same faction was willing to eschew 
peace on the issue of the slaves.
Adams* pessimism grew manifest when the House voted overwhelm­
ingly to call for Jay's instructions. While the Vice-President felt 
the representatives were entitled to review the executive papers re­
lated to the treaty, he opposed their attempt to abuse this power. 
Furthermore, the lower chamber appeared to be grasping for the powers 
of its related branches. Adams lamented: "The House of Representa­
tives seem determined to dictate to the whole government,and the 
result could only be chaos and disunion. Washington refused to sur­
render Jay's instructions to the House. The President's action was 
condemned by the Republicans, but the anti-treaty forces were defeated. 
Finally, on April 30, 1796, Jay’s handiwork was carried into effect.
g O
Charles, Origins of the American Party System, pp. 112-113. 
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, January 20, 1796, Adams Papers. 
bOjohn Adams to Abigail Adams, April 19, 1796, Adams Papers.
CHAPTER 7 ; JAY'S TREATY
CmPTER 7 
JAY’S TREATY
The Jay mission and the resulting treaty were the fruition of 
Federalist foreign policy and they represented the ascendancy of the 
Federalists in the counsels of government. For Adams, the negotia­
tions and the accord were the salvation of the government. Moreover, 
the treaty proved to be quite beneficial to the United States.
During Adams’ presidency the commercial provisions in the treaty 
were to blossom. The concessions which the United States received 
from Great Britain under the accord increased American trade with the 
British Sapire threefold before I8OO. Americans exploited the India 
trade, and by I8OI they were competing with the East India Company 
for European markets. The partial suspension of Article Twelve, which 
placed restraints on American exports, yielded considerable benefits.
In the first place, Americans continued to trade mth the British 
Tfest Indies in their own ships because the local British officials 
badly needed foodstuffs and naval stores. Besides, the United States 
was able to export cotton to England. When Jay was negotiating with 
the British, cotton exports were not important in the United States, 
but after the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney in 1793 the 
production of the fibre increased. In 1796 six thousand pounds of 
cotton were exported to England and in I8OI total fibre exports to the 
British Isles exceeded twenty million pounds.^
Perkins, The First RappybOhement, pp. 13-lb, 70-71.
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The withdrawal of the British from the western posts was com­
pleted in July, 1796. Ironically, the United States was unable to take 
control on the frontier until after the deadline and as a result the 
English were asked to remain in authority until after American soldiers 
could be sent. the various arbitration commissions established under 
the treaty resolved the thorny problems of debts, spoliation claims 
and boundaries with varying degrees of success during Adams' and 
Jefferson's administrations.
It was true that the fruits of the treaty could not be antici­
pated ty atyone in 1795, but on the other hand if the Anglo-American 
imbroglio had continued to fester, war might have ensued. The Fedy 
eralists were anxious to prevent a rupture in Anglo-American relations 
and Jay's negotiations provided them the opportunity to resolve the 
menacing crisis of 179b. Th^ grasped for the machinery of party 
politics and forged their policies into victory over the vociferous 
opposition of the Republicans in Congress and the societies in the 
streets.
The Federalists displayed exceptionally astute political acumen 
in handling the mission and the treaty's passage through Congress. In 
refusing to permit Jay's instructions to be drafted with the aid of 
the Senate, the Federalists insured a successful mission while estab­
lishing a significant precedent in the management of foreign affairs.^
2 m -Î■Miller, Federalist Bra, p. 176.
^Ralston Hayden, The Senate and Treaties, 1789-1817: The Develop­
ment of the Treaty-Making Function 3 ' 'the United States Senate During 
the Formative Period (Hew York, 192̂ ,̂'''p. 92.
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The High Federalist leadership in both houses of Congress, under 
Hamilton's tutelage, resisted nearly every Republican attack. The 
full weight of Washington”s prestige was utilized to sustain the 
Federalist cause.^ The essence of their position was the need to 
support the treaty and its negotiation or dismiss the government.
Adams, not unlike the Federalists, belieVed that it was impera­
tive to accept the treaty or face disunion. He felt that Republican 
opposition, to the treaty was based solely on a desire to weaken, if 
not destroy, the federal government and send the nation into the arms 
of the French. As a result the Vice-President was incapable of under­
standing bona fide political objections to the treaty.
While it is true that the Republicans devoted an inordinate 
amount of attention to really minor issues, such as Jay’s failure to 
secure payment for the slaves emancipated by the British, there were 
several objectionable features in the treaty that enraged Republican 
consciences. The seedbed of their disgust was the ten-year moratorium 
on American discrimnatory duties. To the treaty’s opponents this 
provision was an outright surrender of the nation’s sovereignty and a 
direct assault upon the Republicans’ chief dueling weapon— economic 
coercion. Secondly, by failing to insist that at least a portion 
of the country’s maritime principles be written into the agreement.
a tradition that is old as Jay’s Treaty, Washington was al- 
ledgedly opposed to the results of the envoy’s negotiations. But the 
most recent biography of President Washington fails to substantiate this 
thesis. See Carroll and Ashworth, George Washington, p. 237, and Bemis, 
Jay’s Treaty, p. ii. The President utilized the peace mission to gain 
prestige for the American government. He was anxious to avoid war and 
he hoped that Jay’s negotiation would lead to a general settlement of 
all Anglo-American differences. See his letter to Edmund Randolph, April 
lit, 179U, in W. C, Ford’s edition of The Writings of George Washington, 
lh vole. (New York, 1889-1893), III, %T9.
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Jay was accepting the Rule of 17^6. This aspect of the treaty violated 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Franco-American alliance of 1778 
since it would restrain American trade with the French Indies. And 
the Republicans were anxious to direct as much trade to the French as 
possible. Finally, Jay's willingness to have the central government 
assume the obligations for paying private debts due English creditors 
appeared to the Republicans as an affront to national honor. In short, 
the Republicans believed that the treaty was binding the Americans to 
the British Empire.
The Federalist's opponents lacked the political leadership 
necessary to thwart the treaty's passage. There was no strong party 
leaders in the Senate and James Madison was incapable of dominating 
the faction in the House, The Republicans could not gain the support 
of Washington for their cause. And Jefferson, the party's titular 
philosopher, did little to assist the Republicans in their attack on 
the treaty.^ But the accord did give the Republicans a campaign issue 
for 1796.
Adams appreciated the significance of the treaty and its nego­
tiations. And his public reticence during the debates in the Senate 
and the House revealed his complete awareness that the central theme 
of the presidential elections of 1796 would be the treaty. For instance, 
after the Senate met in June, 179?, Adams dined with the President. 
Apparently both of them discussed the negotiations at length, and
^Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty (Boston, 1962),
p. 2?lt.
^Ibid., Chapter xvi.
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possîfely the Vice-President was enjoined by Washington to withhold any
public judgment of the accord. Adams related to his wife, after the
meeting, that he was not going to express a word "on the fate of the
t r e a t y ."7 gg repeatedly cautioned his wife against discussing the
treaty or the merits of its negotiation with others. Besides, Adams
worked tirelessly himself to appear neutral throughout the summer of
1795 and the winter of 1796. And though he avoided public sympathy
for either the treaty's opponents or supporters, the Vice-President
lamented': "I have no voice [in the proceedings] and although the fate
of the treaty will not be justly imputable to me in any degree, yet
there is reason to expect that many will suspect me;and others charge
me with a greater share jof influencé than would belong to me if I 
8had a voice." Obviously, Adams remained distrusted by the Republican 
faction. His aid to the Federalists was known all.
Adams' concern was genuine. The anti-treaty forces identified 
the Vice-President with the mission. Adams overturned the non-inter­
course bill in 179it and he was certainly a supporter of Washington's 
neutrality policy. In attempting to appear neutral throughout the 
course of the proceedings in Congress, Adams was also laying the 
groundwork for the presidential sweepstakes. Many of those who took
public stands on the fruit of Jay's negotiations committed political 
9suicide.
7John Adams to Abigail Adams, June lli, 1795, Adams Papers.
^Ibid.
^Perkins, The First Rapprochement, p. 31.
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For example. Jay escaped possible impeachment by resigning the 
Chief Justiceship to become Governor of New York. Adams noted that it 
was "happy that Mr. Jay's election was over before the treaty was pub­
lished; for the parties against him would have quarrelled with the 
treaty, right or wrong, that they might give color to their animosity 
against him."^^ Jay's successor to the high judicial office, John 
Rutledge of South Carolina, was refused confirmation by the Senate 
because he was an outspoken opponent of the treaty. Adams remarked
that "justices must not go to illegal meetings and become popular
11orators in favor of sedition." Humphreys Marshall, a nominal Fed­
eralist from Kentucky who voted for the accord in the Senate, was
*1 orecalled by the state's legislature for his deed. And Frederick 
Muhlenberg, the Speaker of the House, was stabbed by his brother-in- 
law after the Speaker broke the deadlock over the treaty in the House. 
With these examples before him, Adams was not anxious to tie his poli­
tical future to the treaty.
Despite the political hazards which came in the wake of Jay's 
Treaty Adams was convinced that Anglo-American accommodation was 
necessary for the nation to withstand the pressure of the European 
wars. The treaty yielded more to the United States than the Treaty 
of Ghent concluded in iBlli. It strengthened the fundamental under­
pinnings of the nation's foreign policy and it assured at least ten
lOjohn Adams to Abigail Adams, June 18, 179^, Adams Papers,
^^John Adams to Abigail Adams, December 17, 1795, Adams Papers. 
1 2Perkins, The First Rapprochement, p. 31.
^%lller. Federalist Era, p. 176.
8 ^
years of peace -with Great Britain. Indeed, if Britain extended recog­
nition to the United Colonies in the temper of defiance in I783, she 
confirmed the sovereignty of the United States in the spirit of amity 
in 1795- And to John Adams the treaty assured the United States a 
few badly needed economic concessions, it permitted the arbitration 
of bi-national grievances and it vouchsafed peace.
^^Historiographical controversy has plagued Jay’s Treaty since 
it was negotiated over a century and a half ago. In the twentieth 
century the debate has centered on Samual Flagg Bemis’ monograph. Jay's 
Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy. Bemis concludes that the 
British were stifling American commerce by their refusal to permit any 
sizeable degree of trade between the two nations. And England hoped 
to create a neutral barrier of Indian states along the American-Cana- 
dian frontier to prevent American expansion. ‘ Furthermore, Professor 
Bemis claims that Hamilton compromised Jay’s bargaining power by pri­
vately instructing the envoy not to threaten the British with American 
participation in a renewal of the Armed Neutrality. He suggests, on 
the basis of Hamilton’s interference with the mission, that the treaty 
should be dubbed "Hamilton’s Treaty." In the final analysis, Bemis 
asserts that Jay failed to secure any valuable concession from the 
British except the withdrawal of the English from the disputed posts.
Bemis’ interpretation of the events was virtually unchallenged 
for nearly two decades. And nearly all biographies of Jay’s contem­
poraries in government since that time have incorporated Bemis' conclu­
sions. As a result biographers of the Founding Fathers have claimed 
their subjects condemned the treaty. For instance, both Gilbert 
Chinard and Page Smith in their respective biographies of John Adams 
claim that the Vice-President disapproved of the Anglo-American accord. 
Only Manning Dauer in his study. The Adams Federalists, concedes that 
John Adams was satisfied with results of Jay’s negotiations.
It was not until the publication of Professor Burt's book. The 
United States, Great Britain and British North America, in 19)10, that 
Bemis' interprelation was examined critically. Burt points to evi­
dence that indicates Bemis overemphasized the British desire to create 
a neutral barrier of Indian states between the United States and 
Canada. Burt contends that the English were willing to surrender the 
posts and evacuate the frontier as soon as the Americans paid their 
debts and demonstrated that they could exercise authority over the 
Indians. He also points out that there was considerably more trade 
between Americans and Canadians than Bemis admitted.
A more recent stu(%r of American diplomacy during the Federalist 
era, Alexander DeConde’s Entangling Alliance, supports the Bemis the­
sis that Hamilton was largely, if not solely, responsible for the
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course and results of Jay's negotiations. But DeConde concedes that 
in 179U the United States could not have secured any more from the 
British.
By far the most judicious treatment of Jay's Treaty is given 
in Bradford Perkinsj The First Rapprbchement g England and the United 
States* 1795-1805. Professor Perkins contends that the treaty was 
not only quite beneficial to the United States* but all that Jay could 
possibly secure in 179b. He points to evidence that indicates con­
clusively the British government extended important commercial con­
cessions to the Americans despite widespread Parliamentary objection. 
Moreover* Perkins relates the story of expanding American trade during 
the decade of rapprochement. These conclusions were reached also by 
H. C, Allen in Great Britain and the United States* A History of 
Anglo-American Relations * 1783-1952 .
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